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Apathy and Activism in the Heartland: The Antiwar Movement at the University of Nebraska, 
1965-1970 
On March 21st, 1968, Dr. Charles Marxer took center stage at the weekly Hyde Park 
Forum in front of the Nebraska Union.1 During his four minute allotment Marxer decried the 
complicity of Nebraskans in a war he saw as unjust and illegal. He rapped on the growing 
opposition to the Vietnam War but expressed his disappointment that, “Unfortunately the 
Movement has not taken hold everywhere. Nebraska, for example, remains a bastion of patriotic 
respectability, dutifully cranking out its monthly quota of expendable bodies for the Great War 
machine with barely a ripple of protest.”2 Professor Marxer’s remarks serve as emblematic of the 
particular antiwar movement at the University of Nebraska in the 1960s and 1970s. Students and 
faculty members involved in the antiwar movement saw themselves as fighting against local 
apathy as well as United States foreign policy, and their most lasting direct impacts came locally, 
rather than nationally. However, the majority of students and faculty at the University were 
largely uninvolved with the antiwar movement.  
 This study focuses on three snapshots of the antiwar movement at the University of 
Nebraska, an institution that has been almost completely absent in antiwar historiography until 
now.3 I chose each for its effects on campus, local media attention, and lasting impacts on both 
the local and national level. First, I examine the formation and initial activities of the local 
                                                          
1 The name “Hyde Park Forum” came from the name of the London park that was known for its public and 
spontaneous speeches, and do not describe the actual location of the event. See: “Speakers to begin Forums,” The 
Daily Nebraskan, Lincoln, Nebraska, Oct. 13, 1965.   
2 Press Release, March 21, 1968, Charles Marxer, Special Subject File – Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, 
Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
3 Steven Witte has an article on the student response to the “Cambodian Incursion,” but his article lacks context on 
both the campus, and the national movement. Stephen Witte, “UNL Reaction to the Cambodian Incursion and the 
Kent State Shootings, May1970,” Nebraska History 75 (1994): 261-271; Outside of an interview of Carl Davidson 
in Prairie Power and an overview in Prairie University, none of the books cited in this study mention the University 
of Nebraska.  
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chapter of the Students for a Democratic society in 1965. Then, I turn to Professor Marxer, and 
his organization the Nebraska Draft Resistance Union. Finally, I inspect student and faculty 
occupation of the Military & Naval Science building in May 1970. While there were other 
organizations on the University’s campus during this time that participated in the antiwar 
movement, these moments serve as the most publicized and had the broadest local and national 
waves.  
SDS 
 The trajectory of SDS at the University of Nebraska reflected the crucible of the national 
organization five years earlier when Carl Davidson formed the local chapter in the fall of 1965. 
The Nebraskan SDS, which formed during a period of rapid growth, had four major similarities 
with the national SDS organization.4 First, both emphasized civil rights from conception. 
Second, each opposed the Vietnam War by 1965 and took issue with draft procedures. Finally, 
both placed a premium on free speech and local issues. After graduating from Penn State in the 
spring of 1965, Davidson enrolled in the University as a graduate student in philosophy.5 By the 
beginning of October, the Student Senate granted the University chapter of SDS a provisional 
status that allowed them to start activities, but the Student Senate did not officially recognize the 
group until later that month.6  
Once the Student Senate approved SDS, the members quickly immersed themselves in 
both local and global civil rights issues. They achieved this by targeting the minds of students on 
campus through their teach-in on South Africa as a response to the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre in 
South Africa.7 Davidson first announced the “week-long program on Africa,” which was part of 
                                                          
4 SDS, 224. 
5 Prairie Power, 33. 
6 “Announcing international protest days October 15th, 16th,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 1, 1965. 
7 Prairie Power, 34. 
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a national SDS demonstration against the apartheid state, in an interview about the organization’s 
upcoming plans for the semester in February of 1966.8 The envisioned program included 
speeches at the Hyde Park forum, “literature on Africa, films, panel discussions and a teach-in as 
the culmination of the week.”9 
The themed week started a month later when SDS organized demonstrations in front of 
four local companies that enjoyed substantial business with the South African government. 
Although SDS initially envisioned direct involvement from more South Africans at their teach-
in, only Growdin Dubay of Rhodesia came from the region.10 After keeping the speakers secret, 
Davison announced the roster one week prior to the event in an interview with the Daily 
Nebraskan. On the docket was Karl Shapiro, an English professor and poet, Reverend Hudson 
Phillips of the United Campus Christian Fellowship, and Carl Davidson, who now served as the 
secretary-treasurer for SDS. 
On the morning of March 20 about sixty students, not all of whom counted themselves 
members of SDS, picketed in front of four local insurance branches and International Harvester 
Corp.11 SDS chose the insurance companies because they considered the companies “major 
stockholders in more than one of eleven consortium banks which floated a $40 million revolving 
credit loan to the government of South Africa.”12 When prompted, Carl Davidson stated that 
SDS targeted International Harvester for, “In addition to being a major interest in the South 
                                                          
8 SDS, 182. 
9 “Davidson to Resign SDS post,” The Daily Nebraskan, February 3, 1966. 
10 “NU African Students to Speak at Teach-In,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 3, 1966. 
11 The insurance companies were: Aetna Life Insurance Co., Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., Travelers 
Insurance Co., Continental Life Insurance Co. “SDS Marchers to Picket Five Lincoln Businesses,” The Daily 




African economy, International Harvester is helping the government of South Africa in the 
development of nuclear reactors.”13 
About one hundred and twenty students attended the teach-in following the march in the 
Union auditorium. It featured Carl Davidson of SDS, Sur Orin, Godwin Dubay, Esron Maryogo 
and Reverend Hudson Phillips. As each speaker presented, members of SDS distributed 
pamphlets stating that “The official policy of the United States toward the government of South 
Africa is opposition, but the actual policy is cooperation.” The central focus of each speaker was 
the U.S. complicity with white supremacist apartheid South Africa; however, Orin, Maryogo, 
and Dubay all sought to educate Nebraskan students on the regime in South Africa. Maryogo, a 
University student from Tanzania, stated that “every condition for totalitarian government is 
present in South Africa today.” Dubay, a student from Rhodesia, explained that the South 
African racial hierarchy was not unique, but that the contemporary stratifications in Rhodesia 
was very similar to that in South Africa.14 
Local response to the march was overwhelmingly negative, while reactions to the teach-
in were more mixed. An employee at Connecticut Mutual felt that protesting local businesses 
was an “awful waste of time” because “The Finance department pays no attention whatsoever” to 
employee input. A passerby called the protest a “disgrace to the country” and wanted the 
university to expel the students involved.15 News Editor of the Daily Nebraskan, Wayne 
Kruscher, in his recurring column, “If I Were King,” criticized the march as “a threat to every 
University student who likes or at least wants to think.”16 Krusher also stated that the teach-in 
was “excellent,” and that “the school can’t have enough of them.” However, in the “Campus 
                                                          
13 “SDS Marchers to Picket Five Lincoln Businesses,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 7, 1966. 
14 “South African Holdings ‘Like Stoke Exchange,’” The Daily Nebraskan, March 21, 1966. 
15 “Marchers Protest Apartheid,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 21, 1966. 
16 “If I Were King,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 21, 1966.  
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Opinion” letter “Resisting is the Only Choice,” one student criticized the rhetoric of the teach-in 
stating “South Africa is content to live at peace with its neighbors; it does not claim that it plans 
to destroy and dominate all who oppose it as the communists do.”17 
By 1965 the antiwar movement reached college campuses. Inspired by the peaceful 
tactics of the sit-ins in the South and soon after the SCLC’s march to Edmund Pettus Bridge in 
Selma, SDS members helped over two hundred professors at the University of Michigan to hold 
the first teach-in.18 Through August, the movement “slowly expanded.”19 Activists and faculty 
from UC Berkeley’s Vietnam Day Committee protested at Oakland Army Terminal, “an 
embarkation point for Vietnam.”20 By October, VDC organized the International Days of Protest. 
SDS at the University of Nebraska participated in the Protest along with nearly one hundred 
thousand others in eighty cities and campuses.21 
On October 1, SDS announced its intentions to participate in the International Days of 
Protest, a condemnation of the war organized by the VDC at University of California, Berkeley. 
The centerpiece of the Nebraskan Protest was to be a teach-in at the Love Memorial Library 
auditorium.22 “About a dozen” members of  SDS at Nebraska succeeded in bringing together 
“Doves and hawks, pacifism and power politics, the domino theory and spheres of influence.”23 
Unlike their teach-in on South Africa, SDS wanted students to see a range of viewpoints and 
                                                          
17 “Campus Opinion,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 21, 1966.  
18 Movement and the Sixties, 125. 
19 Ibid, 140. 
20 Ibid, 140. 
21 Movement and the Sixties, 141; Tom Wells, The War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam (New York: 
iUniverse Books, 1994), 50-51; Penny Lewis, Hardhats Hippies and Hawks: The Vietnam Antiwar Movement as 
Myth and Memory (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2013), 71-72. 
22 “Teach-in Planned for Next Week,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 8, 1965. 
23 For early membership of SDS see: “SDS Plans Viet nam Teach-In,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 14, 1965. For 
quote on teach-in see: “Opposing Views Heard, Argued,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 18, 1965.  
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opinions on the war so they created three panels, each organized by topic with opposing 
speakers.  
The first panel at the standing-room-only event centered on the very presence of the 
United States’ military in Vietnam. Dr. Stephen Ross felt that if the war benefited the nation’s 
interests, then “we should stay; if they aren’t, we should leave.” In the opposing panel, Dr. 
Victor Lane of Wesleyan University, a pacifist, condemned the Vietnam War as he did all wars 
and argued that “violence was evil for man and that nations are not above the standards of men.” 
The next panel focused on the motives of the United States in Southeast Asia. Dr. Albert Winter, 
a self-described “chicken-hawk,” denied that the United States had imperialistic motives in the 
region, whereas Jack Kittredge, Midwestern Coordinator for SDS, focused on the domino theory 
used to justify US presence in Vietnam “Nations don’t change because of their neighbors, but 
because of their internal affairs,” he posited.24 
From the beginning, SDS had a decentralized structure and agenda which encouraged 
chapters to focus on local issues that chapters chose with autonomy.25 However, this increased 
with the rise of the Prairie Power contingency, in which Carl Davidson would figure 
significantly.26 Seemingly, the Hyde Park forum created by the University of Nebraska SDS in 
October of 1965 accomplished and embodied those ends.27 Inspired by the history of public 
debate in the London park of the same name, the forum allowed all students and faculty to speak 
on any topic of their choosing. Members of SDS, embracing the ethos of participatory 
democracy on which SDS was founded, contributed most to the early sessions and tended to 
                                                          
24 “Opposing Views Heard, Argued,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 18, 1965. 
25 David Farber and Beth Bailey, The Columbia Guide to America in the Sixties (New York: Columbia University, 
2001), 248. 
26 Prairie Power, 3-6; Movement and the Sixties, 149; SDS, 280.  
27 Prairie Power, 36.   
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focus on both national and international issues, as the first sessions largely covered Vietnam 
War.28 While the intention of the forum was to discuss local topics and problems, SDS members 
preferred widen that scope from inception. 
However, as the forum allowed any student or faculty member to speak, it also reflected 
the contemporary conservative politics and the interests of students in 1960s Nebraska.29 The 
first forum featured students speaking on the “University Code.”30 Later in the fall, a student 
proposed a “new system of Women’s Hours,” curfews for women in the spirit of in loco 
parentis, that were often more restrictive than those set for men.31 By the spring semester, SDS 
loosened its grip on the forum and the number of issues covered diversified as well as the people 
speaking. In February, the Daily Nebraskan reported that “The subject matter of the speakers’ 
talks was not of Viet Nam, nor of ideology, nor of metaphysics, but of the situations, problems 
and nature of the University campus.” The next week’s forum “revolved around religion, a 
previously untouched issue.”32 Ironically, as SDS members lowered their microphones, and the 
topics became more locally-focused, the organization’s forum embodied the ideals of the 
national SDS more fully than when they were the most numerous contributors.  
During the spring semester, Carl Davison resigned from his post as temporary president, 
and without him the press coverage slowly left. Davidson was an articulate, charismatic leader 
that the press converged on whenever they needed a quote. Even after the members elected him 
                                                          
28 For more on participatory democracy see: A Generation Divided, 24-25. For SDS contributions to campus speech 
see: “Hyde Park…Students, faculty Voice Opinions,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 14, 1965; “Hyde Park,” The 
Daily Nebraskan, November 19, 1965.  
29 Robert. E Knoll, Prairie University (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1995), 150.  
30 “Hyde Park…Students, faculty Voice Opinions,” The Daily Nebraskan, October 1, 1965. 
31 Universities often justified curfews in the spirit of In loco parentis, which asserted that universities assumed 
parenting duties, specifically discipline, The Movement and the Sixties, 97-101. For more on Women’s Hours in 
other campuses see: Gail Collins, When Everything Changed (New York and Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
2009), 151-152.  
32 “Hyde Park Discusses Religion,” The Daily Nebraskan, February, 11, 1966.  
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secretary-treasurer, he remained the most oft-cited member of SDS.33 By being the only SDS 
member to speak at the teach-in on South Africa, he was the public face of the organization in 
another way. At the national SDS convention the summer of 1966, members of SDS recognized 
Davidson’s skill and elected him national vice president, a significant step in the solidification of 
Prairie Power’s legitimacy. Davidson continued his life of activism beyond his work with SDS 
as he later wrote a criticism of student activism itself as he posited that students often fell into the 
trap of working to much within the confines of university systems, which were themselves 
oppressive.34 Davidson’s national post was the most significant contribution the University of 
Nebraska SDS made to the national antiwar movement.  
Excepting Davidson’s national position, SDS at Nebraska made no national waves. 
However, the organization’s first year on campus was a success.  Students wrote letters to the 
Daily Nebraskan about the first teach-in for weeks. The Hyde Park forum was inclusive and 
welcomed a broad range of topics from a diverse set of people and lasted for years. The African-
themed week allowed students to learn about international topics in a manner that the University 
did not provide in the curriculum. While this year does speak to the acumen of activists on 
campus, the inability of SDS to recover after Davidson’s departure for the national office, and a 
Daily Nebraskan poll that concluded that 46% of students “did not know what SDS [stood] for,” 
exposed the pervasive apathy of students even as the antiwar movement was gaining traction on 
campuses nationwide.35 Finally, the year was more peaceful than other state universities with an 
active SDS like Kent State, which suspended the local chapter after seven hundred conservative  
                                                          
33 “NU African Students to Speak at a Teach-In,” The Daily Nebraskan, March 4, 1966.  
34 Jeffery A. Turner, Sitting in and Speaking Out: Student Movements in the American South, 1960-1970 (Athens: 
University of Georgia, 2010), 154. 
35 “100 Random Students Polled on Basic Trivia,” The Daily Nebraskan, February 25, 1966. 
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students “attacked two hundred SDS members and antiwar faculty” with baseball bats and 
chains.36 
NDRU 
In August 1967, twenty-seven-year-old Dr. Charles Marxer came to the University of 
Nebraska as a temporary professor in the philosophy department. When Marxer arrived at the 
University, the antiwar movement was expanding at the most rapid pace yet. In October, the 
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam organized students to protest 
military conscription in Stop the Draft Week.37 The Week “climaxed with the March on the 
Pentagon,” where about 50,000 protestors, including “middle-class liberals, student radicals, 
hippies, civil rights workers, black power advocates, and Vietnam Veterans,” organized on the 
lawn of the Lincoln Memorial.38 However, the absence of the Week in Lincoln again signaled 
the relative apathy of University of Nebraska students, compared to more radical campuses like 
UC Berkeley where “some 10,000 marched on the draft induction center in Oakland.”39 Marxer 
took issue with this apathy and sought to change both the minds and opinions of the students at 
the University while also attempting to dismantle the conscription of young Nebraskan men to 
fight in what he saw as an unjust and illegal war.  
Marxer first announced the formation of the Nebraska Draft Resistance Union at a Hyde 
Park forum on March 21, 1968.40 Draft resistance unions existed at other similar universities, 
like SUNY-Buffalo which the FBI surveilled between 1965 and 1970.41 NDRU, which the 
                                                          
36 Campus Wars, 37. 
37 The Movement and the Sixties, 177; W.J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War: The 1960s (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1987); The War Within, 191-194; Seth Rosefeld, Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals and the 
Rise of Reagan (New York, Picador, 2013), 385-385.  
38 The Movement and the Sixties, 178.  
39 Terry Anderson, The Sixties (New York: Longman Press, 1999), 98. 
40“NU Instructor says state barely ripples with Protest,” Omaha World Herald, March 22, 1968.  
41 Campus Wars, 35; Movement and the Sixties, 158-159.  
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University had not yet formally recognized, had two central purposes.42 First, to stop the war 
through draft resistance and, second, to educate “young people about the unjust and illegal nature 
of the war, the misdirection of our country’s foreign policy, and the coercive, and anti-
democratic character of the draft.” To accomplish these ends, Marxer announced the four 
activities of NDRU. First, Marxer planned on educating the students by printing “special purpose 
leaflets.” Second, the organization wanted to promote a “We Won’t Go” pledge of draft-eligible 
men on campus who refused military induction. The pledge read, “We believe the war in 
Vietnam to be illegal and immoral. As long as our country is involved in that war, we shall 
refuse to serve in the Armed Forces.” Third, he wanted to council men classified as I-A, or 
available for military service, by draft boards and educate them on their options to avoid military 
service. Finally, Marxer advocated peaceful draft resistance. He supported men “returning draft 
cards, draft card burning, non-registration, non-cooperation, and induction refusal.”43 No 
students signed that day.44 
Dr. Royce Knapp, a professor of education at the University, spoke in opposition to 
Marxer at the Hyde Park forum.45 Knapp took issue with several of Marxer’s stances. He saw 
draft resistance as illegal and encouraged students to follow the law because “without the law we 
have anarchy.”46 Instead of participating in protests, which he saw as disrupting the democratic 
process, he advised students to voice their protests with their ballots and elect representatives 
                                                          
42“Anti-Draft Rally Gets Brush Off: NU Professor’s ‘Pledge Card’ Plea Falls on Deaf Ears,” Hastings Tribune, 
March 22, 1968. 
43 “Nebraska Draft Resistance Union ‘Press Conference,’” March 21, 1968, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union 
(NDRU), Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska. 
44 “NU Instructor Says State Barely Ripples with Protest,” Omaha World-Herald, March 22, 1968.  
45 “Anti-draft Rally gets Brush Off: NU Professor’s ‘Pledge Card’ Plea Falls on Deaf Ears,” Hastings Tribune, 
March 22, 1968. 
46 “State Draft Resistance Union Established by Group at NU,” Lincoln Star March 22, 1968. 
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that held similar views. Ironically, Knapp closed his speech by stating that students should 
follow their conscience. That is, Knapp wished students follow his conscience, not theirs.  
Response to NDRU and Marxer’s speech varied but almost entirely negative. Even at the 
forum itself, which over two hundred students attended, the audience was overwhelmingly in 
favor of Knapp. The only exceptions were a few students wearing black armbands in protest of 
the war.47 In fact, the loudest applause of the forum came when a student yelled “Let’s hear it for 
Dr. Knapp,” after the professor stated that he felt he represented much more of the faculty than 
Marxer did.48  
The community and local politicians answered Marxer and NDRU with vitriol. A. Eileen 
Seares, in a letter to chancellor Clifford Harden, called Marxer’s promotion of draft card burning 
“treason” and expected his contract with the University to expire in light of his comments on the 
war.49 State Senator Clifton Batcheldor of Omaha took the most offense to Marxer and NDRU. 
Batcheldor wanted the University to terminate Marxer because of his statements, creation and 
heading of NDRU, and support of burning draft cards. He asked the county attorney, Paul 
Douglas, to file charges but Douglas refused as he did not think that the actions were “criminally 
connected.”50 Batcheldor used his position as an elected official and representative as a 
justification for exerting power over the University. He believed that, because the state, that is, 
the taxpayers, gave $60 million to the University annually, the state senate, who represented the 
people, should have enjoyed some control over the University.51 The University Board of 
Regents disagreed.  
                                                          
47 “Anti-draft Rally gets Brush Off: NU Professor’s ‘Pledge Card’ Plea Falls on Deaf Ears,” Hastings Tribune, 
March 22, 1968. 
48 “N.U. Instructor Says State Barely Ripples with Protest,” Omaha World Herald, March 22, 1968.  
49 Letter by A. Eileen Sheares, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union (NDRU), Demonstration, Student (May 1970) 
draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.  




The University of Nebraska Board of Regents also criticized Marxer’s remarks, but 
defended his right to speak. A statement from Dr. B. N. Greenberg, President of the Board, 
clearly expressed their thoughts on Marxer’s comments. “The Board of Regents is in complete 
and unanimous disagreement with Mr. Marxer and his remarks,” but continued, stating that “In a 
democratic society Mr. Marxer as any citizen, has a right to express his personal views, 
disagreeable as they may be,” Greenberg wrote.52 In the release Greenberg also stated that the 
University investigated Marxer both in the legality of his actions and teaching and found that he 
was not in violation of any laws.53 He did write, however, that the University would terminate 
Marxer in June.54  
The Buffalo Chip, an Omaha-based underground newspaper named for the excrement of 
the eponymous animal, released the only in-depth articles on NDRU. This was not unique to 
Nebraska, as the “treatment of antiwar demonstrations was often more detailed, accurate, and 
objective, if more breezy,” in underground publications during the Vietnam War.55 NDRU 
operated out of one of the many churches on campus, presumably the United Ministries in 
Higher Education.56 The organization’s office was Spartan, containing only “a desk, a phone, a 
couple of filing cabinets and piles of information on draft regulations and how to beat them.”57 
Wanting to avoid service, over forty students, including graduate students, sought out NDRU in 
                                                          
52 Press Release, University of Nebraska News Service, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union (NDRU), Demonstration, 
Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Covering Dissent, 5. In fact, the Berkeley Barb was created in response to poor press coverage of the antiwar 
movement, W.J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War: The 1960s (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987), 35.  
56 The Buffalo Chip provides the only in-depth article on the organization itself and simply refers to NDRU using a 
“University of Nebraska campus church.” However, in a report on the events of May, 1970 the Daily Nebraskan 
refers to the United Ministries in Higher Education as a “center of campus anti-war and anti-draft activity.” 
“NDRU,” Buffalo Chip, May 1968; Sylvia Lee, “How It Was,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May, School of 
Journalism, July 1970 Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, 
University of Nebraska.  
57 “NDRU,” Buffalo Chip, May, 1968.  
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its first month. Marxer emphasized the localization of conscription to those who sought the 
coveted Conscientious Objector status, since “much of the draft decisions are made by the local 
boards.”58  
After Marxer’s termination, NDRU suffered but expanded, if only for a short time. By 
the fall of 1968 NDRU existed on both the University of Nebraska and the University of Omaha 
campuses. The Union’s philosophy remained the same in Marxer’s absence, “We want to build 
resistance to the draft and the war in Vietnam” John Dietz told Buffalo Chip. Speaking for the 
organization now, he continued to advocate Marxer’s initial preferred form of resistance of non-
cooperation. He also shared Marxer’s strategy of appealing to the emotions of students as he 
believed they were “reaching the conscience of our peers.”59  
 
May, 1970 
Whereas the national antiwar movement hit its zenith in 1968, the height of student 
dissent on the University of Nebraska campus came during the spring semester of 1970, a delay 
that other state universities did not see.60 By 1970 neither NDRU nor SDS existed in Lincoln.61 
So when President Richard Nixon announced a bombing campaign in Cambodia on April 30, no 
dedicated antiwar organizations existed on campus. One might expect continued apathy in 
Lincoln, even though for “hundreds of thousands, even millions, of students, faculty, and staff at 
more than half of the nation’s colleges, ‘business-as-usual’ became unthinkable,” due to the 
activist vacuum on campus.62 But this was not the case, as ASUN, led by its newly elected 
                                                          
58 “NDRU,” Buffalo Chip, May, 1968. For more on the power of local draft boards see: The Sixties, 87-88. 
59 “NDRU,” Buffalo Chip, May, 1968. 
60 Campus Wars, 3. 
61 For more on the demise and fallout of SDS see: SDS, 557-616; The War Within, 304-306. 
62 Richard E. Peterson and John A. Bilorusky, May 1970: The Campus Aftermath of Cambodia and Kent State 
(Stanford: Carnegie Foundation, 1971), xi.  
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president Steve Tiwald, picked up the banner of the movement and waved it more vigorously 
than ever before seen on campus.63  
 The president’s speech created an immediate reaction from the National Student 
Association and the University of Nebraska administration. Tiwald received a telephone call that 
night about an emergency meeting of the NSA the next day in Washington, D.C. At the meeting 
Tiwald voted in affirmation, along with fifty-four other campus leaders, in “calling for the 
impeachment of President Nixon.”64 Dr. G. Robert Ross, executive dean of student affairs, 
sensed that problems might arise on campus and requested a special meeting with other 
administrators on Monday, May 4. The three-day delay proved costly as students moved more 
quickly than administrators predicted, and the deaths of four Kent State students at the hands of 
the Ohio National Guard brought an anger to the University that had not yet existed.  
 Immediate student response to the announcement of the bombing campaign in Cambodia 
was mild. On May 2, the Innocents Society, a student organization founded in 1903 that was 
unique to Nebraska, and modeled itself after “senior societies on eastern campuses,” wore black 
armbands at their convocation to protest Nixon’s new plan in Cambodia.65 The crowd met the 
armbands with gasps and applause. Students also made plans to canvas local residents to voice 
their protest of the president’s Cambodia campaign and made plans for an antiwar rally on the 
north side of the Union building.66  
 On Monday, May 4, the rally started as planned. Hundreds of students attended. Soon 
after it began, Philip Medcalf, a student, grabbed an outdoor microphone and began what he 
                                                          
63 Dana Parsons, “Student Leadership ‘Vital,’” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May, School of Journalism, July 
1970, Curtis-Demonstration, Student Policies, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of 
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64 Lee, “How It Was – A Chronological Account,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May. 
65 Prairie University, 44. 
66 Lee, “How It Was – A Chronological Account,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May. 
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would later call a “rabble-rousing” speech.  He implored students to leave campus and bring the 
demonstration to the Lancaster County Draft Board Offices. About half of those present at the 
rally, including twenty-seven-year-old English professor Dr. Steven Rozman, followed him and 
marched to the draft office. Soon after they arrived, an unnamed protestor broke the door to get 
into the office and, using the damaged property as justification, the police officers present 
declared the assembly illegal and evacuated the office. Some of the students allowed themselves 
to be arrested in protest of the draft. Professor Rozman followed them to the police station and 
spent the afternoon “trying to obtain their release.” Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs, G. 
Robert Ross, after notification of the arrests, met with city attorneys and police at the County-
City building to discuss the options of the students and administration following the arrests.67  
 Meanwhile at the rally, Tiwald presided and read the NSA’s statement on the bombing in 
Cambodia and the proposed nation-wide strike of classes. The students decided to “write letters 
of protest to Nebraska’s congressional delegation.” However, the mood of the rally changed 
from peaceful to mournful as word of deaths of the four students at Kent State reached Lincoln. 
The news made about one hundred and fifty students leave the antiwar rally outside the Union 
and head towards the “terminal building to hold a silent vigil outside.” By 7:30 p.m. about two 
hundred students met at the United Ministries for Higher Education, which had “been the 
primary meeting place for anti-draft and anti-war groups on the university campus.” Again, 
disagreements on their plan of action quickly divided students, and by 8:00 p.m. about one 
hundred students, including Alan Siporin and Dan Ladely, whom the University administration 
would later identify as leaders in the occupation, left the UMHE with the intention of occupying 
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the Military & Naval Science building, also known on campus as the “ROTC building,” in 
protest. The meeting at the UMHE continued without the separated faction, symbolizing a break 
between radicals who no longer believed in working within organized structures and liberals who 
still held the faith.68 With Tiwald presiding, the students discussed their options moving forward 
including “canvassing, letter-writing, [and] petitions.”69 
 The march on the Military & Naval Science building was not entirely unexpected and 
Colonel Gist, professor of military science, requested the janitorial staff to lock all entrances to 
the building earlier that evening. Soon after, Vice Chancellor Ross, who also had concerns about 
the building, arrived to meet with Col. Gist and campus police captain Gail Gade. Within thirty 
minutes of Ross’ arrival, the protestors met the locked entrance. This proved to be of little 
importance as the students broke the lock and forced their way in, even as campus police officers 
attempted to barricade the door. The students again refused to let police restrain them. Ladely 
proclaimed that they had taken the building and invited those still outside in. The occupation of 
the Military and Naval Science Building, the height of the student antiwar movement at the 
University of Nebraska, had begun.70 
 Throughout the night of May 4 the population of the Military & Naval Science building 
swelled, with estimates reaching two thousand occupants. As “only 13 percent of students 
identified with the New Left in 1969,” and the University had 18,000 students in 1970, further 
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proving that the activism at the University reflected the larger national movement.71 Several 
faculty members also participated including Professor Rozman, Dr. Philip Schribner, assistant 
professor of philosophy Dr. June Levine, and Dr. David Levine the chairman of the Psychology 
department. Inside, activity centered on the “pit,” a depressed area in the center of the building 
the ROTC used to practice hand-to-hand combat. Two rock bands, Bald Eagle and Frigate, 
played music while a caterer sold tacos and sandwiches. Discussion in the “pit” started on the 
war and the focus turned to cultural reform through the night. This change in attention came 
from the demands students made of University administration.72 
 President of the Lincoln campus, Dr. Joseph Soshnik, planned to leave the city the night 
of the fourth to attend an alumni meeting in South Sioux City. However, after hearing about the 
events on campus, he chose to stay, and in doing so may have prevented a violent end to the 
occupation. President Soshnik reached the ROTC building at about nine that night and 
immediately went to the campus police headquarters with “Vice Chancellor Ross, Police Captain 
Gade, Dean of Faculties Magrath, ASUN President Steve Tiwald and others.” They returned to 
the ROTC building at about ten. By that time “under the very loose – and periodically denied – 
leadership of Alan Siporin, Dan Ladely and Maggie Young, a student who had been one of the 
organizers of the short-lived NU chapter of Students for a Democratic Society,” the 
demonstrators had arrived at six demands to present to the University administration.73  
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 First, they requested amnesty for those arrested at the draft board office and any “who 
might be arrested at the ROTC building.” Then, they called for administration backing of the 
NSA strike on classes and suspension of University ROTC until the U.S. withdrew from 
Southeast Asia. Fourth, they sought to remove all guns from campus, including campus police. 
They concluded their demands with insistence on public meetings of the Board of Trustees and 
for “all Free University classes to receive one hour of credit toward degrees.” None of the 
demands came to fruition in the coming years. However, Soshnik and the rest of the 
administrators with him retreated back to the campus police office to discuss the demands and 
returned at about 1 a.m., when Soshnik explained that he did not have dictatorial powers and had 
no power to meet any of the demands. Soshnik, recognizing the need to reduce the “unbelievable 
tension” between the administration and occupants, again left for campus police office to prepare 
an official statement.74 
 Meanwhile, during the “negotiations [that] were beginning at the ROTC Building, an 
even larger crowd was gathering at the Nebraska Union ballroom for an emergency meeting of 
the Student Senate” of the ASUN. Not only did the senate reach a quorum, but thirty-three of 
thirty-five senators attended the meeting, further proving that this was the height of the antiwar 
movement and the nadir of apathy on campus. The senate passed four resolutions at the meeting. 
They requested a meeting “between students and local law enforcement officials in an effort to 
prevent a repeat of the Kent State tragedy.” Then, recognizing the importance of the moment and 
the desire to be inclusive, they called for an “all-University town hall meeting” for the following 
afternoon in the Coliseum to vote on the proposed NSA strike. The third and fourth resolutions 
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focused on the senate’s rhetoric, which emphasized a condemnation of violence and that the 
strike was “not against the University but against the foreign policy of the United States.” At the 
conclusion of the meeting, most in attendance left for the Military and Naval Science building.75 
 By about three in the morning on May 5, Soshnik returned to the occupied building 
where he read the statement he prepared. Students held mixed feelings, but responded positively 
to Soshnik’s speech, which recognized the need for open discussion. Many students and faculty 
members, believing that there was nothing more to accomplish through occupation, left. Others 
took Soshnik’s speech as tacit permission to stay in the building and by 6 a.m., about two 
hundred students remained. While the students stayed in the building, Vice Chancellor Ross 
contacted Flavel A. Wright of the law firm Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson and Oldfather, 
which represented the University. Ross inquired about obtaining an injunction to remove the 
occupying students. Ross then went to the ROTC building and alerted the students that they 
could remain in the building if they stayed in the “pit.” Soon after, Soshnik told some of the 
occupiers he saw as leaders that they had to leave the building by 6:30 a.m., but they responded 
by reasserting the autonomy of individuals in the building. The occupiers persisted and stated 
that they would not leave until the special faculty meeting scheduled for noon that day. Again 
fearing violence, Soshnik moved the meeting to 10:00 a.m. and the building emptied in time for 
the meeting.76   
 The faculty senate meeting caused the emptying of the ROTC building, but did little 
more to alleviate the feelings of demonstrating students. The senate voted preemptively to not 
impose sanctions on students who wished to strike. However, it did not concede to any of the 
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demands made by Siporin, Ladely, and Young the previous night. In spite of that, the meeting 
was open to students in an effort to avoid increasing the already high tension between the 
demonstrators and administration. That afternoon, the all-campus town hall meeting started as 
scheduled. Estimates on attendance ranged from four to nine thousand. However, with a student 
population of eighteen thousand, this meeting was not entirely representative of the student body. 
The meeting’s central issue was participation in the NSA’s nation-wide student strike. Ultimately 
about five thousand students voted to join about one quarter of public universities in the strike, 
more than the sum of votes submitted in the 1970 ASUN elections. While the strike began the 
next day, the apogee of activism had passed.77 
 While thousands of students voted to strike, only a small percentage participated. As 
University News later broadcasted on KRNU, the University’s radio station, the term “strike” 
was a misnomer. They cited the pejorative and violent connotations of the term and suggested 
that “boycott” was more accurate.78 Participation in the strike varied between colleges. The 
College of Agriculture and Home Economics, the College of Engineering and Architecture, the 
Teachers College all reported normal class attendance. The College of Arts and Sciences and 
College of Business both reported a fifteen percent drop in attendance. The English department 
in the College of Arts and Sciences saw the highest participation in the strike, with only about 
half the students attending class, which was a common theme for English departments at other 
campuses like Penn State where the English department “obtained some measure of national 
recognition and became a locus of faculty and student antiwar dissent.”79 Some faculty members 
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also suspended classes; however, this was a minority as over 95% of classes met as scheduled. 
Again, the English department was the most active department as one fifth of the classes did not 
meet.80  
 However, the small dip in official classes did not result in an abatement of education. 
Both faculty members and students led strike classes. Many of these occurred in the English 
department and were “mainly concerned the situation on the Nebraska campus, including strike 
activities and ideas for educational reform.” The Union also hosted strike classes that focused on 
military and foreign policy as “faculty, including ROTC faculty, participated in the meetings as 
did Administration officials.” President Soshnik spoke at one two-hour class and students gave 
him a standing ovation after he concluded.81  
 Dissent by University of Nebraska students was not limited to campus, or even the state 
of Nebraska. On May 8, Ken Wald, Randy Reeves, Chuck Faulkner, and Dennis Berkheim, 
financed by donations that they raised themselves, boarded a plane for Washington D.C. The 
largest donation the students received came from Chancellor D.B. Varner who gave the students 
one hundred dollars. He later said that he had received criticism for the donation, but he 
reaffirmed his stance that direct petitioning of elected officials, not public protests and building 
occupations, were the “the proper way to protest.”82 The students had mixed feelings about their 
trip to Washington. When they met with Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa, the staff was friendly 
and he helped the students organize their plans for protesting. Senator Frank Church of Idaho, a 
dove who “introduced an amendment to a military sales bill cutting the appropriations for troops 
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in Cambodia” in the wake of Nixon’s April 30 announcement, was receptive to the students’ 
concerns.83 However, when they met with Nebraskan senators Carl Curtis and Roman Hruska, 
they found that both were “quite uniformed about student activity and opinion in Nebraska” and 
were critical of the strike because they believed it deprived students the opportunity to learn.84  
 The weekend following the occupation of the ROTC building signaled the end of 
widespread antiwar activism on campus. On Saturday, May 9 the ASUN was the largest funder 
of a peace rally held outside Memorial Stadium concurrent with the annual spring football game. 
In spite of the efforts of speakers like Omaha Black Panther David Rice, author John Swomley, 
Reverend Tom Rehorn, president of the U.S. Farmers’ Association, Fred Stover, and Reverend 
James Armstrong, the passersby met the rally with apathy as few attended the rally after the 
football game. The next day the ASUN organized another all-university town hall meeting. The 
most pressing item on the agenda was the continuation of the strike. Prior to the meeting 
“Radicals gathered at the United Ministries in Higher Education, and Conservatives at the Zeta 
Tau Alpha Sorority House.”85  
 Fueled by “The violence of the war in Southeast Asia and the crisis of violence in 
education, [and] the increasing division between students and other citizens,” the students at the 
UMHE created a proposal for the upcoming town hall meeting. They suggested the creation of a 
“new university” that aimed to reform the university’s current pedagogical approach and student 
involvement in politics. The radicals at the UMHE drafted a five-point proposal for the 
hypothetical institution. First, they expected each class at the University to devote some time to 
educating students in a manner more relevant to the “concerns and needs of the students.” Then, 
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they called for the continuation of classes that would reflect and expand on the teachings at the 
strike classes. Third, the creation of student groups “concerned with educational reform at the 
University.” These groups would work with both the ASUN in order to create a more 
“meaningful education,” because they believed that there were “aspects of the ‘normal 
functioning’ of the University that [were] seriously repressive and inimical to the growth of 
students.” Fourth, they requested that the “new university” allow students to take incompletes 
when they found it “unproductive to continue in normal classes.” Finally, in order to increase in 
student participation in elections, they asked the administration to move Thanksgiving break to 
before November elections so that students could aid the campaigns of the candidate of their 
choosing. The drafters of the final proposal intended it to be a response to critics that saw the 
strike as destructive as well as a means to increase student political activism.86  
 That night, about three thousand students attended the town hall meeting. The only item 
on the agenda was a vote on continuing the strike. After the collection of the secret ballots, the 
students planned another town hall meeting for the next day. The meeting, which had attendance 
estimates range from 1,500 to 6,000, was “ostensibly to announce the results of the Sunday 
vote,” in which students voted 1357 to 1030 to end the three-day strike. However, after the 
declaration of the previous night’s referendum results, another vote occurred. This time, the 
result was overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the strike. Conservative students on campus, 
especially the Young Americans for Freedom and the Committee for Undisrupted Education, an 
unofficial ad-hoc organization that condemned the strike, criticized the results of the second 
strike vote as several hundred students left after the announcement of the previous meeting’s 
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vote, including most of the members of YAF and CUE and did not participate in the second, 
spontaneous vote.87 
 Nonetheless, the strike ended. By May 12 class attendance returned to normal and strike 
classes ceased. On the same day the University Senate reviewed each of the proposals made to 
create a “new university,” but the recommendations ultimately fell on deaf ears.88 At the 
conclusion of the meeting, which the Senate opened to students, Dr. Peter McGrath, Dean of 
Faculties, read a statement that reflected positively on the previous two weeks, emphasizing that 
the “educational process has continued to take place at [the] University,” which remained 
“peaceful, but not unconcerned,” and that “regular curriculum has also been intensified and 
supplemented by constructive additional educational effort.”89  
 The peace that McGrath praised, and the rest of the University administration was so 
careful to preserve, broke the following night when two students, Robert Buchsbaum and Jeffery 
C. Gunkel, who acted in isolation, threw “firebombs” through an open window in the Student 
Union building. Both students had participated in the strike and actively protested against the 
war.  The fire did not catch and the attempt to burn down the Student Union succeeded only in 
burning the rug the “firebomb” landed on.”90 A second arson attempt occurred a month later on 
June 10 when “fires causing $15,000 in damage were set at the ROTC building.” However, 
despite the implicit connection due to the occupation of the same building a month prior, the 
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Commission of Inquiry on Disruptive Actions called for by University chancellor D. B. Varner 
found no connection between the fire and the building occupation.91 
 By the beginning of June, with the semester over, campus returned to its ways before 
Nixon’s April 30 announcement. Two events broke the return to normalcy on campus. First, the 
self-titled “college of life,” an unofficial organization, erected a tent on the lawn outside the 
Student Union building with president Soshnik’s permission. The “college of life” was a group 
of students looking to continue the communal spirit that emerged from the antiwar protests over 
the previous weeks. The “college” never had many participants, and did not disturb regular 
classes.92 The final event that sparked students was the shooting of two students at Jackson State 
College by city and highway police on May 14. However, unlike the Kent State shootings that 
helped fuel the occupation of the Military & Naval Science building and the height of the antiwar 
movement at the University, students remained apathetic in the face of the further student deaths 
at the hands of their government. The next day, a poster announced a silent vigil sponsored by 
the Afro-American Collegiate Society for that night at the “college of life” and asked attendees 
to “Bring a Candle! Bring a Friend!”93 About forty students, most of them black, attended.94 
 Although the ASUN served as the central leader and organizer during the height of the 
antiwar movement at the University, especially through President Steven Tiwald, leadership was 
often decentralized, unofficial, or non-existent. Moreover, students labeled as leaders, especially 
when the title came from outside the movement, rejected it for a variety of reasons. Tiwald, who 
“felt a tremendous dual responsibility,” as the ASUN president and as a sympathizer with the 
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antiwar movement, wanted to provide a democratic avenue for students to determine the 
direction of the antiwar movement on campus.95 Dan Ladely and Allen Siporin had a tenuous 
relationship with leadership. Both helped draft the occupants’ demands, but when administrators 
requested that the two help evacuate the building, they claimed that they could not control the 
crowd and that no student ever officially led any part of the occupation or the march to the draft 
office. Neither planned on becoming a leader in the occupation, while both embraced the 
opportunity to be a spokesperson.96 Ken Wald was also labeled as a leader in the campus antiwar 
movement, but did not “Conceive [himself] as having a tremendous amount of influence on 
people.”97 The “college of life” claimed no leaders.  
 Student activists cited different catalysts for their involvement in the events on campus in 
May of 1970. Ken Wald “got involved to express [his] abhorrence and disgust with the United 
States’ foreign policy.”98 Siporin did not participate in the movement at all until he “heard on 
May 4 about the killings at Kent State and learned that some of his friends had been arrested” at 
the State Selective Service headquarters.99 Ladely later stated he hoped that educational reform 
would result from the strike. While the University Senate ultimately rejected each of the 
demands students made when occupying the ROTC building, a different form of change took 
place on campus.  
 Although the University never accepted any of the official demands or resolutions made 
by the student radicals, the events of May did have lasting effects, albeit less tangible ones. 
Later, both Siporin and Ladely felt that the occupation of the ROTC building resulted in breaking 
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down the “caste system” that existed on campus. Both believed that there had been a significant 
rift between students and administration which the month’s events helped ameliorate.100 Bruce 
Wimmer pointed out that even though students were deeply divided in their ideals, “the 
University community was drawn a little closer together” because of the constant debates 
between the two sides. English Professor Paul Olson expressed that students now knew how to 
express their complaints with the University. Chancellor D. B. Varner made an effort to connect 
with students and appointed a student to his staff to ensure he kept “in tough with student ideas 
an feelings.” While the University strayed away from punishing students, the University regents 
dismissed Professor Rozman after the 1971 academic year ended. However, an investigation the 
same year submitted a 1,704 page report and concluded that Rozman “was not guilty of 
inappropriate actions” which led some professors to later believe the administration used him as 
a scapegoat which was part of a larger, national culling of antiwar faculty.101 The University 
faculty and administration, in spite of its conservative slant, tended to tolerate student and faculty 
dissent more than most, as a 1969-1970 survey concluded that 79% of faculty approved of the 
“expulsion of student activists.”102 Finally, although the University administration, which had 
been “more available than any other…in recent memory,” was already reevaluating curricula to 
make the education students received pertinent to problems students face after graduation, 
admitted the strike “spurred along many of the programs already under consideration.”103 While 
the impetus for activism was United States’ foreign policy and the shootings at Kent State, and 
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the original ambitions of students were to change the nation’s involvement in Southeast Asia, the 
most lasting results were on the University’s campus.  
  Like the response to NDRU and the initial activities of SDS, community reaction to the 
events of May 1970 was largely negative and failed to respond to the arguments and motivations 
nested in the antiwar movement and instead criticized superficial phenomena like the appearance 
of protestors and their methods of protesting. W.R. Redding viewed the “demonstrations on the 
Lincoln campus with alarm and disappointment.”104 The general public also misunderstood the 
student strike, and thought that it disrupted the educational process and prevented students not 
participating from attending regularly scheduled classes.105 Central to every criticism was the 
perceived lack of order on campus, the contempt for dissent, and advocating for the expulsion of 
any student or faculty member who participated in the antiwar movement.106 W.R. Redding 
stated that neither he, Chancellor Varner, the recipient of his letter, nor the state, had “anything 
to gain by coddling or negotiating with this segment of society” and called for the dismissal of 
any students involved.107 State Senators also joined the criticism. State Senator Terry Carpenter, 
who was “sick and tired of these long haired professors,” stated that any participant, including 
faculty members, should be “busted.”108 Further, Lincoln print media maintained an openly 
conservative slant that was atypical of media nationwide during the second half of the Vietnam 
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War.109 Not only with the events of May, but with all three snapshots examined here, Lincoln 
newspapers never gave the same amount of attention to antiwar activists as those criticizing the 
movement, which was a “misapplication of the ‘fairness doctrine’” that some newspapers used to 
present the views of those critical of the movement “in order to balance those of the doves.”110 
Administration response to the criticism was dismissive. President Soshnik summed it up well 
when he stated that “These people have constitutional rights that they don’t lose when they walk 
on campus.”111 
 As evidenced by the vote to end the strike, students at the University did not universally 
support the strike or the occupation of the ROTC building and reflected the larger anti-antiwar 
movement. The two most vocal organizations were YAF and CUE. YAF distributed three 
leaflets throughout the month of May, each criticizing the antiwar movement. However, none of 
the leaflets took issue with the motives behind the actions, but instead focused the methods of the 
activists. One such artifact cited several passages from philosopher Ayn Rand condemning civil 
disobedience when “encroaches on the rights/property of others.”112 CUE’s sole concern was 
criticizing the student strike, specifically the process through which the strike started. CUE 
likened the process to the post-WWII trials at Nuremberg, and referred to those calling for the 
strike “a small group of self-appointed foreign policy experts who are more interested into 
turning it into a political circus than the pursuit of education.”113 
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 Different events served as catalysts for the antiwar movement at the University of 
Nebraska. Dr. Marxer took issue with the conscription practices, the teach-ins at other campuses 
and the national antiwar movement inspired SDS to educate students, and the Cambodian 
incursion and subsequent shootings at Kent State spurred the events of May 1970. But, within 
these different events and inspirations, each compartment of the antiwar movement in Lincoln 
fought to challenge local opinions and reduce apathy as a means of changing national policy.  
 This essay contributes to the historiography of the antiwar movement generally, and 
specifically to the niche of examinations of individual universities as the University of Nebraska 
was a non-elite, Midwestern university with no reputation for political activism. Its 
accomplishments are two-fold. It complicates the perception of apathy at the University of 
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Modern Warriors: An Examination of The Veteran and Vietnam Veterans Against the War using 
MALLET and Voyant 
 
 Using MALLET and Voyant to interpret The Veteran revealed an organization that 
perpetually focused on the present, while keeping an attentive eye on the past. Throughout The 
Veteran’s tenure, the newspaper analyzed and criticized various contemporary aspects of the 
world, constantly updating the list of issues with which it grappled. However, Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War never lost sight of the Vietnam War, the conflict that birthed the organization. 
Using digital tools to parse through the more than 120 editions of the newspaper revealed that it 
kept its finger on the zeitgeist’s pulse while simultaneously remembering the war that it rallied 
against. Further, this exposes the current historiography on VVAW as narrow as none emphasize 
the eternal modernity of the organization.  
Using digital tools to interpret historical documents is relatively new to the study of 
history, but those in digital history already espouse its value. Even more novel are tools for 
textual analysis. MALLET, a command-line program that utilizes latent dirichlet allocation, is 
one of those tools. Simply put, LDA is a mathematical equation that parses through a corpus and 
returns “topics” of words that co-occur throughout a document. Because of MALLET’s ability to 
analyze a corpus large enough to contain thousands of books relatively quickly, “topic modeling 
is one of the hottest trends in digital humanities research today.”114 Even more than its speed, 
topic modeling can reveal aspects of a corpus that conventional “close-reading” cannot. By 
showing the user words that tend to relate to each other across the corpus, “distance-reading,” 
that is using computers to “read” documents, with MALLET shows the user how “documents 
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relate to one another, how they relate to topics, how topics are related to each other, and how all 
of those are related to words.”115 Exposing these trends between topics and words is the true 
value MALLET lends this project.  
 In its early days VVAW focused on recruitment and spreading the message that there 
were servicemen in and out of the military that opposed the war. The founders of VVAW first 
coalesced in the spring of 1967 after Jan Berry and five other vets painted a banner at an antiwar 
march through New York in April of that year.116 Berry oversaw the infant organization’s first 
meeting where those in attendance elected him president.117 That fall, two thousand vets and a 
“small group” of VVAW members joined tens of thousands of other protestors at the National 
Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam’s march on the Pentagon. However, another three years 
passed before the organization held its first major event.  
 Operation Rapid Action Withdrawal, more commonly referred to as Operation RAW, 
was VVAW’s first public demonstration. Occurring in May of 1970, and taking advantage of a 
thirty percent growth in membership following the Cambodian incursion and the death four 
students at Kent State, VVAW wanted to increase their own publicity in order to increase 
membership while protesting the war. The Operation was a march from Morristown, New Jersey 
to Philadelphia, where the GIs performed “guerilla theater” to simulate war zones for civilians. It 
was also the first time future vice president and presidential candidate John Kerry spoke for the 
organization. Ultimately, Operation RAW was crucial to the organization as it facilitated growth, 
attracted future leaders of VVAW, and “served as a prototype for future VVAW protests.”118 
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 Inspired by the Citizens Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam that 
investigated the massacre at My Lai, VVAW wanted to further publicize American war crimes in 
Vietnam. What resulted was the Winter Soldier Investigation in early 1971. The investigation’s 
title took its name from Thomas Paine’s American Crisis which posited that “The summer 
soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from service of his country.” VVAWers 
wanted to prove that they were in fact patriots, and exposing war crimes was a patriotic act.119 At 
the Winter Soldier Investigation VVAW hoped to “show that My Lai and other atrocities were 
not isolated incidents, but logical results of U.S. policies.”120 The event took place in Detroit, 
Michigan in an effort to gain support from the general public and distance themselves from 
Washington politics. In spite of funding and public endorsements from Hollywood star Jane 
Fonda, the Winter Soldier Investigation failed to achieve its main objective of publicizing the 
experience of GIs in Vietnam, and it would not be until the next year that the media would fully 
acknowledge the organization’s rhetoric.121 
 Named as the third episode in a trilogy of military actions, Operation Dewey Canyon III 
again hoped to bring media attention to the veteran’s opposition to the war and the manner in 
which the military used them as individuals.122 Like the Winter Soldier Investigation earlier that 
year, the vets hoped that their personal testimonies would increase public opposition. This time, 
they specifically sought out D.C. landmarks and politicians, which ultimately lead to a massive 
increase in media attention. Dewey Canyon III consisted of “Five days of marching, lobbying 
Congress, performing guerrilla theater, and speaking against the war. At the close of the week’s 
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activities, VVAWers planned to return their combat medals to the government.”123  Although 
millions viewed Kerry’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was the open-
air testimony and return of medals by vets that resulted in increasing VVAW’s credence in the 
eyes of the media and antiwar movement at large and served as the event’s climax.124 
 Aptly, the Last Patrol was the final major, public demonstration by VVAW. Sensing the 
war could not last much longer, the vets targeted the 1972 Republican National Convention for 
their “final offensive.”125 About 1,200 VVAW members participated.126 On Tuesday of the 
convention the vets formed four neat rows and, with military discipline, marched silently to the 
convention. “There is nothing left to say” one member told a reporter.127 The silent march had a 
“profound” impact on Hunter S. Thompson who was in in Miami to cover the convention as a 
part of his Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72. In spite of his gonzo style that blurred 
reality and fiction, Thompson’s writing reflected the wider, generally sympathetic media 
coverage on the Last Patrol.128 Following the march to the convention, they requested permission 
to enter and security acquiesced, letting in three wheelchair-bound vets. Once inside, they began 
chanting in an attempt to delay Nixon’s acceptance speech and security guards summarily 
removed them from the hall.129 Keeping a theme, the vets again saw themselves as rejected by 
their president.  
 Following the signing of Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 
VVAW evolved with America’s foreign policy, but could not forget the war that consumed their 
lives. The lasting effects of Agent Orange and the group therapy rap sessions dominated the 
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years immediately following the war. For VVAW the use Agent Orange in Southeast Asia, a 
chemical used to destroy vegetation, was a legal matter and lead the lawsuit battles against the 
creators of Agent Orange.130 In addition to the legal conflicts, which ultimately resulted in a 
settlement to VVAW’s chagrin, VVAW relied on public actions like the Winter Soldier 
Investigation of Agent Orange in December 1979 and sit-ins at Veterans Administration 
hospitals in the 1980s to expose the treatment of vets after the war.131 None came close to 
reaching the scope or impact of previous events. Although the informal rap groups began before 
the war’s end, VVAW blazed a new trail for recovering from the traumas of war. VVAW 
developed a strategy in which the vets retained primary control of the group therapy sessions, a 
departure from previous methods that relied on professionals to direct recovery.132 It is this vet-
focused style that the VA would copy years later.133 Although the war was over, VVAW retained 
a tight focus on it, for a time.  
 For the last forty-four years, The Veteran has served as the major news publication by 
VVAW. 134 The Veteran was an underground newspaper, albeit an unconventional one amidst a 
sea of eccentricity. When defined as any publication that openly opposed the “American 
‘system’ politically, culturally, socially, and economically,” underground newspapers “as a 
group exerted influence on American popular culture,” The Veteran certainly fit into this 
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framework.135 However, unlike most underground publishers, VVAW was not solely comprised 
of college students. In spite of this, the casual tone, open criticisms of the government, hand-
drawn pictures, openly biased articles, and articles with an anonymous author all fell in line with 
the schemata other underground newspapers. This classification is important as it freed 
contributors to The Veteran from the strictures of conventional print media, specifically the open 
bias, drive to increase profits, and appeal to a broad reader base. The Veteran also fell into the 
category of underground GI newspapers which proliferated after 1968.136   
 Although MALLET served as the main tool for creating topics, getting a final product 
from MALLET takes time. The user must go through a series of steps in order to “train” the 
program to produce usable results. This project required ten iterations to see quality results. The 
first two were simply experiments with the program. For the third I added stopwords and an 
optimize interval of 10. Although MALLET comes with an automatic list of English stopwords, 
words that the program does not factor into its topics because they occur too frequently thus 
muddling the topics, the user must add their own customized list of stopwords.137 The optimize 
interval in MALLET “turns on hyperparameter optimization, which allows the model to better fit 
the data by allowing some topics to be more prominent than others.”138 This is an especially 
useful command for this project as it shows the supremacy of certain topics over time, 
accentuating the modernity of VVAW. Iterations four, five, and six all adjusted stopwords and 
the optimization interval. Iterations seven, eight, and nine were experiments with the number of 
topics. If the user requests too many topics, they become vague. Too few and important topics or 
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words may not appear. Fifteen topics is optimal for this project as it shows the diversity of topics 
without having too many vague ones.139 So, by iteration ten, I had perfected the stopwords list, 
input an optimization interval of 10, and adjusted the number of topics to fifteen.  
 The final topics reveal a newspaper that always kept an eye on modern events but 
remembers the Vietnam War vividly and stands as a contrast to prevailing histories on the 
organization. Of the fifteen topics, eleven focus on the experience of VVAW members after 
discharge.140 The rest tangentially or directly relate to their experience in Southeast Asia.141 
Further, seven topics have no direct relationship to the VVAWers’ experience in the war.142 The 
disparate nature of these topics show the varied interests of VVAWers which current histories 
tend to ignore. Further, as the majority of these topics focus on their experience after the war, 
rather than their time in it, exposes faults in the narratives on VVAW. The two main histories of 
VVAW, The Turning and Home to War, both focus on public events put on by VVAW, namely 
the four outlined here. Those four events are here for their importance in the long history of 
VVAW, but they also serve the purpose of emphasizing that they are decidedly absent in The 
Veteran.  
 Surprisingly, the most significant moments in the history of VVAW, Operation RAW, 
the Winter Soldier Investigation, Dewey Canyon III, and The Last Patrol, are of little import in 
the organization’s main publication, in spite of historians’ insistence on focusing on them. 
However, as only Operation RAW occurred during the newspaper’s tenure, the publication could 
not cover the prelude and aftermath of first three. In spite of the lack of overlap, the short-term 
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memory of The Veteran further exposes the varied interests of its authors as they do not 
frequently mention them enough to create their own topics.  
 Topics 8, 9, 6, and 12 dominated the paper and are present in almost every issue. Topic 8, 
titled “Post-War Life,” was a near-monolith in The Veteran. It was present in every issue, and 
was the most prevalent topic in all but twenty seven issues. The topic’s nadir came from 1973 to 
1975 when Legal Troubles/WSO, Topic 13, reigned supreme. Topic 8 saw another drop in 
prominence from Volume 5 Number 7 to Volume 7 Number 5 when issues with employment 
came to the forefront. Topic 8 showed that VVAW’s prime topic was focusing on how their life 
was after the war, and everything is through its lens. Topic 9, Military, was the second most 
common. Like Topic 8, Topic 9 showed up in every issue in the full run of The Veteran. 
However, unlike Remembering the War, which was often the most prevalent topic in an issue, 
Military was rarely the highest topic, and was never amongst the lowest categories in any 
issue.143  
 Much like Topic 8, Topic 9 showed that authors saw every event through a militaristic 
lens and frequently relied on their experiences in the military to explain modern phenomena. 
Further it showed that, as veterans, VVAWers concerned themselves more with America’s 
international affairs and armed services more than they do with various domestic issues. Topic 6, 
Remembering the War, was the third most popular. Remembering the War was the first topic to 
not appear in every iteration. In fact, it became most popular in the 1980s, once the memories of 
the war became easier to bear and veterans had been able to ease their burdens through the group 
therapy that encouraged vets to express their emotions about the war. The last major topic is 
Topic 12, Vietnam in School. Topic 12 arose in 39 of the charted issues. Like Remembering the 
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War, Vietnam in School saw a rise in the eighties and is prominent in every issue after Volume 
11 Number 3 and is the most prominent narrow topic, as Topics 8, 9, and 6 are all fairly generic 
and do not fit into any specific time period, explaining their longevity. Further, Vietnam in 
School, Topic 12, rose in prominence throughout The Veteran’s run. This rise suggested that 
how schools taught the Vietnam War increased in status to VVAWers as they became parents. 
Embedded into Topic 12 is VVAW’s response to the proliferation of literature on the Vietnam 
War over the last two decades, which VVAWers frequently reviewed, discussed, and 
criticized.144 Following the top four topics, there is a relatively large drop-off in prevalence.  
 The next most prominent topics all had short, but marked tenures in The Veteran. First, 
Topic 7, Employment, did not appear until Volume 5 Number 1, and did not have a single 
manifestation after Volume 10 Number 3. This delayed onset showed that employment issues for 
veterans did not come into the purview of vets until after United States’ withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia. Further, the short tenure of Topic 7 suggests that VVAWers saw employment as 
a relatively unimportant issue once the eighties began. This is unsurprising as by 1987 Vietnam-
era veterans had an unemployment rate only .03% higher than the general population. However, 
veterans with disabilities had a more difficult time finding work with a disability rate 1.9% 
higher than other veterans.145 Topic 13 is the first muddled topic as MALLET conflated 
references to the Winter Soldier Investigation and the Winter Soldier Organization, a sister 
organization to VVAW that allowed civilians to join.146 However, what is not muddled is that 
Topic 13 figured most prominently in The Veteran in the period during and immediately 
                                                          
144 For examples of VVAW literature reviews see: Kurt Hilgendorf, “This History’s Bunk,” The Veteran, Spring 
2004; Jerry Lembcke, “Still a Force for Peace,” The Veteran, Fall 2003.   
145 Sharon R. Cohany, “Employment and Unemployment among Vietnam-era Veterans,” Monthly Labor Review, 
April 1990, 25.  
146 Hunt, 170; Nicosia, 226-228.  
42 
 
following the debates on the inclusion of civilians in VVAW. Topic 5, Agent Orange, was also a 
fleeting issue. With only appearances on five charts, Agent Orange does not appear to be nearly 
as a pervasive issue as Nicosia surmised, positing that Agent Orange helped refocus VVAW in in 
the late 70s.147 However, as the words “agent” and “orange” both appeared in three topics next to 
each other, this shows that adding codes to group phrases in MALLET is necessary in future 
iterations.148 Topic 14, Reagan Presidency, proved the modern nature of The Veteran as Topic 14 
appears in all but one issue from the fall of 1979 to the winter of 1987, with the highest rating of 
any topic in any issue in Volume 14 Number 3. VVAWers frequently discussed Reagan, often 
deriding him for his foreign policy issues, for example Evan Douthit’s rebuke of the president’s 
role in the Iran-Contra affair.149 This group of issues shows the varied interests of VVAW.  
 The final grouping of topics again showed the array of VVAWers’ concerns and their 
perpetual modernity, while simultaneously exposing the narrowness of the current historiography 
on VVAW as none appear in published works on the organization. Topic 10, The War on Terror, 
unsurprisingly shows up after the September 11th attacks and subsequent US involvement in the 
Middle East. Further, it appears in every issue after Volume 39 Number 1 and received a 
Medium rating in every issue after Volume 41 Number 1, meaning that VVAWers began 
criticizing the US military’s involvement in the Middle East early and often.150 This shows that, 
even decades later, VVAWers showed no reticence or reluctance to condemn US militarism, 
especially in a conflict in an undeveloped state as Vietnam was during the war. Further, the 
inclusion of “IVAW,” the Iraq Veterans Against the War, in the topic is telling as it exposed the 
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solidarity between the two organizations, especially after the Winter Soldier Investigation: Iraq 
and Afghanistan that criticized the war in the same manner as the eponymous event VVAW 
organized.151 Legal Matters, Topic 2, was the next in line in terms of prominence. Topic 2 was 
most prevalent in the early years of the newspaper as many members found themselves 
embroiled in lawsuits and trials. The high water mark for Legal Matters came in Volume 4 
Number 5 which featured articles on the Bob Hood trial, VVAWers advocating the right to 
strike, and demands for universal amnesty for draft-dodgers and a single discharge that would 
eliminate dishonorable discharges.  Topic 0 received attention in only four issues, but its narrow 
focus shows that VVAWers fixated on Central America, the title of Topic 0, when United States 
foreign policy focused on the region, another example of VVAW’s focus on foreign policy. 
Topic 0’s only High rating came in 1990 when members expressed solidarity with El 
Salvadorians who resisted US intervention and criticized US involvement in Panama and 
Colombia.152 Topic 3 shows the shortcomings of MALLET as well as it also focused on the War 
on Terror. Like Topic 10 of the same name, Topic 3 shows up after the spring of 2003, however, 
it does not appear after 2010. The final topic, Articles by Barry Romo, is interesting as it shows 
up in Volume 4 Number 3, but never appears again until Volume 21 Number 1. However, upon 
closer inspection, this is also the issue when the transcriptions of all articles began including the 
author, whereas before many articles had no author in the byline. As Barry Romo was the most 
prolific author of VVAW it is unsurprising that he generated his own topic once his name 
appeared with all his articles.  
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 There are alarming absences in the topics MALLET produced that go beyond the four 
major events mentioned previously. First, Gainesville and Eight never appeared in any iteration. 
In spite of the trial that accused eight members of VVAW of conspiracy to disrupt the 1972 
Republican National Convention, the words never appeared and neither did any of the names of 
the accused. Also intriguing is the lack John Kerry’s presence. Kerry was a prominent member 
of VVAW and spoke in some of the most publicized events for VVAW including giving 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a part of Dewey Canyon III which 
millions watched on TV. Further, his long career as a senator, secretary of state, and cabinet 
member also complicated his absence. One would expect the most famous and politically 
powerful alumnus of such a political organization to be the focal point of numerous articles, 
especially in light of the prominence his service during his presidential run in 2008 during which 
his service and participation in VVAW came under intense scrutiny. Perhaps the best example of 
this is Unfit For Command, a book criticizing Kerry’s actions both during and immediately after 
his service in Vietnam.153 However, many VVAWers had a low opinion of Kerry even when he 
was an active member in VVAW because they believed that he was using the organization to 
start a political career and thought himself superior to other, less elite VVAWers.154 This distrust 
and dislike of Kerry explains his absence in the face of his eminence. In spite of these absences, 
the topics presented by MALLET give a great overview of The Veteran’s run.  
 The second digital tool used in this project is Voyant, a “web-based text analysis 
environment that helps you visualize the distribution of words within a single text or compare 
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their usage across a number of texts.”155 So, in contrast to MALLET, which analyzes how words 
relate to each other, Voyant measures the popularity of a single word across a corpus. Also 
unlike MALLET, which requires some comfortability with command-line inputs in place of the 
more popular graphic user interfaces, Voyant has a stand-alone website that is much more user-
friendly. Voyant is not perfect for all “distance reading” projects, however as it not “well adapted 
for managing a very large collection of texts.”156 At just over one hundred editions, The Veteran, 
seems to be the perfect size for Voyant as it is large enough that digital methods greatly ease the 
reading burden, and small enough that the user can easily interpret Voyant’s results.  
 Voyant provides several tools for the user, the most basic of which is a measurement of 
the most popular words in the corpus presented in a customizable word cloud, once the user 
inputs the stock and customized stop-words.157 The most popular words in the full run of The 
Veteran, presented in Voyant’s word cloud, do not yield dazzling results as the largest words are 
“war,” “veterans,” “Vietnam,” “people,” “VVAW,” and “vets.” The most useful tool Voyant 
provides for this project is its measurement and charting of relative frequency of individual 
words.158 Further inspection into Voyant by measuring the frequency of single words across the 
full corpus, however does hold merit.  
 The most common words across the corpus, listed above, like the most common topics, 
appear in every issue, and with generally high frequency. The most common word, “war,” never 
dipped below 19 mentions, and peaked at just over 120, corroborating MALLET’s output on the 
prevalence of the military, Topic 9, throughout The Veteran. Further, the word’s use rose in 
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recent years, showing that VVAWers became interested in not just the Vietnam War, but also the 
multiple military engagements of the US military in the Middle East. The next most popular 
words, “Vietnam,” “veteran,” and “veterans,” each saw a general upward trend in frequency with 
“Vietnam,” peaking in Volumes 12 and 13. Although VVAWers never lost sight of the war in 
which they fought, the rise of “veteran” and “veterans” reflected VVAW’s solidarity with IVAW 
and their support of the plight of all veterans, not just those who served in Vietnam. Unlike 
“veteran” and “veterans,” “vets” and “vet” balance out their longer forms as they declined in 
popularity as “veteran” and “veterans” rose. In an effort to gain legitimacy and an air of decorum 
and professionalism, authors stopped abbreviating words. After these individual words there was 
a massive drop-off in appearances.  
 Issues regarding expanding VVAW’s potential membership base had fleeting presence. 
In 1973 VVAW officially expanded its possible pool of members by permitting civilians to join. 
The debate on this expansion shows in Voyant as words like “women,” “sexism,” “WSO,” and 
“VVAW–WSO,” only saw spikes in popularity in the years surrounding the decision. “WSO,” 
had no mentions through Volume 3 Number 3, then saw a rise in Volume 5 Number 5, but 
received no mentions since. Similarly, “VVAW–WSO” was only mentioned in five issues, none 
of which were after Volume 5 Number 4.  “Women” had a relatively low frequency throughout 
The Veteran’s tenure, only rising above ten uses per 10,000 words five times, three of which 
were within two years of the inclusion of civilians, and thus a rise in the relative population of 
women in VVAW. However, the number of women in VVAW were always “sparse,” and 
“VVAW remained thoroughly dominated by white males, possibly more than any other mass 
movement at the time.”159 “Sexism” had a similar trajectory as it had minor popularity, never 
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rising above ten mentions per 10,000 words, through the first five years of The Veteran and 
almost no mentions after. Gender, like many other issues, were fleeting in VVAW.  
 The next grouping of words all revolved around post-war issues and perceptions of the 
war and corroborated MALLET’s findings on corollary topics. First, “Patriot” was the most 
infrequent word examined here. Never rising above three mentions per 10,000 words, and only 
seeing use in two or more consecutive issues four times, the dearth of the word showed VVAW’s 
reluctance to see any service member in high regard. “Agent Orange” also matched MALLET’s 
output on the eponymous topic. The phrase did not appear until eight years after printing began 
and held sustained prevalence until Volume 15 which observed a massive drop followed by 
murmurs until Volume 40 Number 1 when The Veteran featured an article on a bill to increase 
aid to Americans and Vietnamese affected by the toxin.160 “Employment” also matched its 
namesake in MALLET. “Employment” had its high-point in the early years of the newspaper 
and a drop after Volume 6 with relatively infrequent mentions following. “Jobs” complicated this 
however as it had a both a higher prevalence and a higher volatility than “Employment.”  
 The final grouping of phrases revolved around the four major events put on by VVAW 
and show the short-term memory of VVAWers. Neither “Operation RAW” nor “Operation 
Rapid” broke the two instance mark and received almost no attention after Volume 4.161 “Winter 
Soldier” was in vogue in the earlier issues of The Veteran, but saw a stark fall through the 
eighties and nineties until the formation of IVAW which held its own Winter Soldier-inspired 
event, mentioned above. Additionally, “Dewey Canyon” and “Dewey Canyon III” both have low 
horizons, with few exceptions caused by shorter editions of The Veteran more than high 
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frequency. Finally, writers discussed “The Last Patrol” even less than any other events and 
ignored it entirely until The Veteran’s sixteenth year. In spite of their importance to historians, 
VVAW’s major events seem to be of little import to VVAWers after the fact. This is because of 
the members of VVAW focused on the present, and wanted to grapple with current issues rather 
than continually rehash old events and faded memories. While VVAWers put great value on the 
events during the time in which they occurred, it was the issues those events responded to, more 
so than the event itself, that the VVAWers continued to write about.  
 In conclusion, textual analysis tools like MALLET and Voyant lend themselves well to 
interpreting a corpus the size of The Veteran’s full run and exposed the simultaneous modernity 
and long-term memory of VVAW. Through The Veteran’s entire run VVAWers focused on 
contemporary, generally international issues, extending their historical relevance by decades in 
comparison to the exiting historiography on the organization that ends their story prematurely. 
However, VVAW never lost sight of the Vietnam War and the high prevalence of topics directly 
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contras bases page panama reagan aid south economic guard policy invasion honduras contra 
box peace  
1 – Vague 0.13258 npa school ceremony recruitment hollywood sports hostages art thc 
recruiters wayne gao balweg letter ceremonies oppressed jews mia tapes dis  
2 – Legal Matters 0.12587 vvaw nixon trial u.s american defense prison government 
soldier box brothers indochina winter states united political military crimes discharge vvaw/wso  
3 – War on Terror 0.08428 iraq vvaw ivaw bush soldier winter members ptsd don’t it’s 
march iraqi afghanistan troops contact barry chapter event families bob  
4 – Articles by Barry Romo 0.07932 u.s colombia gulf states barry united romo vieques 
anniversary coordinator clinton insignia memorial gls clarence w's persian bush antiwar thirty  
5 – Agent Orange Fight 0.15807 vets agent u.s orange government south v.a 
problems fact africa effects situation draft hell carter postal vfw there's pac chemical  
6 – Remembering the War 1.15511 vietnam vietnamese back years remember knew 
thought good children man base time guys kill vet nam died lot viet experience  
7 – Employment  0.28232 vets workers fight rich vvaw people bill country struggle 
class jobs working system union veteran fighting vet day page benefits  
8 – Post-war Life 3.11358 war people veterans vietnam national time vets years day 
back members support work year part make state end office chicago  
9 – Military  2.18846 military american country world government service president 
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10 – War on Terror 0.14502 iraq orange agent afghanistan ivaw ptsd service wars care 
members victims organizing campaign obama trauma mental hood health iraqi work  
11 – Vague/North Vietnam 0.07467 hanoi chi minh north show french laos giap housing 
van heal meese guide p.o center bac platoon ortega willson baker  
12 – Vietnam in School 1.10657 war veterans vvaw vietnam peace soldiers veteran 
years school book combat health home life day students lives anti-war history community  
13 – Legal Troubles/Events 0.18184 people wso struggle government trial police 
vvaw/wso soldier repression working charges winter system amnesty imperialism u.s riverside 
vva thieu support  
14 – Reagan Presidency 0.15536 vets vietnam agent orange vvaw reagan u.s vet 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Historiography of the Antiwar Movement in the American West 
For most authors, to write on the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War in the West 
is write about the University of California, Berkeley. To put it in Kirkpatrick Sale’s prophetic 
and succinct words for rationale on this narrow emphasis, “Berkeley had it all. And had it, 
moreover, in extremes.”162 For this historiography, the West is defined as all land between the 
Mississippi river and Pacific Ocean. Although this definition provides a large swath of land, 
especially in the second half of 20th century in which the West had a more modern and diverse 
society than any previous time in history, it is large enough to allow for comparisons within the 
region. Specifically this facilitates comparisons between the prairie states and the coast. The 
historiography is not complete however, as the experiences of women, minorities, and 
organizations outside of Berkeley like the Vietnam Veterans Against the War are 
underrepresented.  
This historiography starts with an aberration, albeit a necessary one that refuted a popular 
contemporary notion of the antiwar movement as exclusively consisting of economic elites. “The 
Changing Social Base of the American Student Movement” responded to previous research 
asserting that activist students of the 1960s were products of “humanistic, liberal, middle-class 
families.”163 The sociological study argued for a shift in the demographics of the antiwar 
movement compared to earlier in the decade. Based on surveys from students at the University of 
Wisconsin–Madison, the authors found that “there is unquestionably a widespread feeling among 
students across the country concerning the basic issues which have been foci of protest, 
representing a dramatic shift of student opinion to the Left over the past five years.” That 
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“dramatic shift” was one of economic status. The survey compared “veterans” of student 
activism, that is, students who had expressed discontent for three years prior to May 1968 when 
Mankoff and Flacks distributed questionnaires, to newcomers. They found multiple differences 
between the two cadres. The two authors most emphasized the rise in prevalence of rural roots of 
newcomers, their Christianity, less educated parents and siblings, and relatively less political 
awareness, thus bringing complications to a young field.164 
It is the detailing of this change on the origins of activists that makes “The Changing 
Social Base of the American Student Movement” relevant to this historiography. Further, 
Mankoff and Flacks approached the article from a Marxist standpoint. The two argued that “the 
combination of deepening cultural crisis (rooted in the impact of advanced technology on 
traditional capitalist values) with a rapidly expanded incorporation of young people into 
segregated enclaves created the ground for the emergence of widespread generational 
consciousness – a consciousness in considerable tension with established authority.”165 Further, 
the two hypothesized that there was a growing class consciousness among students and that the 
longevity of the movement depended on newcomers becoming more politically well-versed. 
Todd Gitlin was the only other academic to analyze the antiwar movement from a Marxist 
perspective, further adding to the importance of this article.  
Kirkpatrick Sale’s SDS chronicled the origins, rise, and breakup of the Students for a 
Democratic Society, which he argued was the most important organization in the antiwar 
movement in the 1960s. Like subsequent historians, although he himself was not a professional 
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scholar, Sale argued for the preeminence of the Port Huron statement as it “provided [an] 
intellectual framework for the New Left.”166 He further argued that SDS  
“was initially responsible for opening up the left spectrum of politics in this country, successfully 
introducing the concepts of participatory democracy, corporate liberalism, local organizing, 
student power, the new working class, revolutionary consciousness, and imperialism, with the 
eventual effect of not only pushing the liberal canon to the left but establishing socialism as at 
least a possible political alternative for a considerable segment of the population.”167  
In the West, Sale presented myriad dimensions of the student organization. Sale, like 
subsequent authors with a national scope, placed an emphasis on UC Berkeley. Sale integrated 
the Free Speech Movement at the university into his narrative and posited that academics and the 
media alike misunderstood the movement because they saw it as a reaction to the impersonality 
of the multiversity. Sale pushed against this interpretation as many of the most prominent 
members of FSM, including its leader Mario Savio, sought out UC Berkeley as transfer students. 
Further, Sale argued that FSM inspired SDS, especially its embodiment of participatory 
democracy.168 Sale does not exclusively focus on UC Berkeley, in fact the author dedicated an 
entire chapter to Prairie Power. He suggested that Prairie Power represented a change from the 
“Old Guard,” or previous members of SDS. Prairie members of SDS were more anarchical, and 
pushed for a decentralization of the power in SDS and ultimately had “pervasive” power in 
SDS.169 Sale contributed to this historiography by detailing the truly national history of SDS, a 
major intellectual and organizational player in antiwar movement. 
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In 1989, frustrated by the lack of local studies and the over-emphasis on national media 
and Washington D.C., W.J. Rorabaugh released Berkeley at War: The 1960s. Rorabaugh’s 
monograph exclusively focused on the Bay Area city and saw the decade as a struggle for local 
power. Rorabaugh saw Berkeley as representative of a nation-wide rise of liberals on the local 
level and posited that those on the “bottom saw less a disintegration of society than a rebirth of 
community spirit and individual liberty in opposition to a corrupt, bureaucratic social order,” 
which he argued was the most “profound legacy of the sixties.”170 Each of the chapters in his 
book focused on a different issue in the city. Chapters one and three were of most use here. 
Chapter one looked at the university from WWII to the mid-1960s. Of particular interest was his 
focus on FSM, which he used to show popular support of the organization from students and 
faculty in FSM’s fight for more political freedoms for students. Chapter three vetted 
anticommunism in the city, in which the antiwar movement deeply intertwined itself. He gave an 
in-depth analysis of the Vietnam Day Committee, the underground newspaper The Berkeley 
Barb, teach-ins, the marches and riot at the Oakland Induction Center, Stop the Draft Week, the 
city’s news, the local SDS chapter, and the Vietnam Commencement. Cumulatively, he used 
these events to expose the pervasive and varied antiwar movement in the city as it evolved 
through the decade, inched towards radicalism, and increased its own power. Rorabaugh’s 
contribution to this historiography is a deep and thorough local study on what is the most oft 
referenced western city in the antiwar movement.  
The 1990s saw an explosion in this historiography as professional historians began 
publishing full-length monographs on the national antiwar movement. Started by Charles 
DeBenedetti and finished by Charles Chatfield after DeBendetti’s death, An American Ordeal, 
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which sought to chronicle the entire antiwar movement, was the first. In it the two emphasized 
the discursive nature of antiwar movement, a duality marked by liberals and radicals. In the 
afterword with sole authorship by Chatfield, he marked the difference stating “antiwar liberals 
saw the war as a policy issue, antiwar radicals as a means toward revolutionary social change. 
The former tried to de-escalate and then end U.S. military involvement, while the latter 
challenged intervention in an attempt to transform the distribution of power and privilege in 
America.”171 However, in spite of its national scope, An American Ordeal saw the entire West in 
the San Francisco bay. He used the 1964 UC Berkeley teach-in to argue that it really was about 
speech rights on campus and the disconnected bureaucracy in America and not the Vietnam War, 
connecting it to the ethos of FSM. Further, FSM provided the impetus for the Vietnam Day 
Committee, a “strange concoction of radical pacifism, student protest, civil rights activism, leftist 
politics, and cultural bohemianism peculiar to the Bay Area.”172 The only Western events to get 
any specific attention were the disturbances at the Oakland Induction Center in October, 1967. 
The two authors used the event to mark the radicalization of, and subsequent debates within, the 
movement, as radicals had “achieved a new level of unreality.”173  
The 1960s: From Memory to History was an excellent compilation of articles on the long 
sixties. Of most use to this historiography was Kenneth Cmiel’s chapter “The Politics of 
Civility” that examined the antiwar movement from its comprehension of decorum. Cmiel took 
special interest in UC Berkeley through his examination of FSM and subsequent Filthy Speech 
Movement as representative of the counterculture that he characterized “not an attack on 
politeness, but rather an ‘alternative,’ that was not based on restraint, but rather an expression of 
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individualism from ‘liberated human beings.’” He further expounded that, in spite of hope for a 
change in American culture, a revolution, the dream went unrealized.174 He then turned to the 
political left which viewed the Vietnam War and racist as the true obscenities in America, not the 
word “fuck” or long hair.175 It was this accusation of incivility, Cmiel posited, that had lasting 
consequences in American culture.176 Further, is this article’s focus on civility and rhetoric, with 
tangential connections to Berkeley that made this article important here.  
Also from 1994, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Antiwar Movement investigated the 
relationship between the media and the antiwar movement. In it Melvin Small argued that the 
media affected the public’s opinion on the Vietnam War. However, Small goes as far as to say 
that the media misrepresented the antiwar movement in both scale and convictions which lead to 
a reinforcement of public perception that viewed the movement with skepticism. Small leaned on 
prominent national news sources for his book, specifically The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, Time, Newsweek, and the three nationally televised nightly news programs of NBC, ABC, 
and CBS. He choose these because he was concerned with the connections between public 
perception, the media and national policy. Further, as the presidents monitored these seven 
sources closely, they best served his ends. Although Small did not have grant significant 
attention to the West, he used publications that enjoyed national circulation and therefore his 
arguments applied to the West as much as the rest of the nation.  
Terry Anderson’s The Movement and the Sixties, argued that the antiwar movement was part of a 
larger shift in America, which he collectively referred to as “the movement,” was more porous 
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than previous portrayals.177 Anderson’s national overview, the second of its kind in this 
historiography, went beyond any specific focus on leaders, ideology, or organizations because of 
the permeable and fluid nature of the movement, allowed him to chronicle the spread of the sea 
change.178 He asserted that the movement came to the West after its crucibles in the South in the 
fifties and early sixties.179 Once in the West, Anderson retained his wide scope. He tackled 
myriad topics across the region and mentioned more disparate universities and cities than any 
other author mentioned here. For example, he cited two pro-war rallies at Brigham Young 
University, antiwar housewives in Denver, and a resolution the Californian Federation of 
Teachers passed condemning the war.180 However, in spite of his attempts at a national scope, 
Anderson could not escape UC Berkeley. Most notably, Anderson used the VDC to mark a split 
between radicals, who were willing to use violence to achieve their ends, and liberals, who 
exalted education and nonviolence.181 Anderson’s most significant contribution to this 
historiography fits into the ethos he set out with. For example, He exposed the intersectionality 
between the civil rights and antiwar movements through the Black Panthers’ occupation of the 
capitol building in Sacramento.182 Further, he noted interweaving of the counterculture and the 
antiwar movement. The best instance of this was the San Francisco Human Be-in. Although the 
most prominent outcome of this event may have been the coining of Timothy Leary’s now-
famous ethos of “Tune in, turn on, drop out,” the Be-in was notable to Anderson because of Jerry 
Rubin’s call to end the war.183 Anderson’s tome on the shifting culture of America exposed how 
interconnected the changes really were. 
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Jerry Lembcke’s The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam  vetted 
the story of civilians spitting on GIs. As Lembcke outlined, it was usually a woman antiwar 
activist who would spit on the GIs as they arrived home from war in Oakland. Through his 
research, Lembcke could not find a single concrete piece of evidence that corroborated the myth. 
In fact, Lembcke posited that antiwar groups tended to be sympathetic towards GIs because of 
their opposition to the draft and disproportionate numbers of working-class men pulled into the 
war.184 Further, Lembcke saw the intersections of the myth, GIs, antiwar activists, and VVAW, 
and therein lies the value of The Spitting Image. As Lembcke focused largely on the role of 
movies in their portrayals of warriors and antiwarriors, much of his book located itself in 
America. The most recurring setting in the West is the Oakland Induction Center. Lembcke used 
this setting best in his refutation of Coming Home’s portrayal of antiwar activists where he 
demonstrated the “inversion” of “historical reality” by the film that showed animosity between 
protestors and GIs in spite of the demonstrations only ever occurring before GIs left for Vietnam, 
not when they returned.185 By examining the cultural power of the media, Lembcke finds sources 
for the myth of animosity between antiwarriors and veterans.  
The Turning, an examination of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, was intriguing for 
this geographically-based study as its only mentions west of the Mississippi were brief sentences 
on the actions of individual chapters. In spite of VVAW being a national organization with 
members and chapters in all fifty states, there was a dearth of activity in the West.186 Most 
notably, none of the major events put on by VVAW, Operation RAW, a march from Morristown 
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to Valley Forge, the Winter Soldier Investigation, which sought to expose US war crimes in 
Southeast Asia, Dewey Canyon III, a “limited incursion into the nation of congress,” and The 
Last Patrol, a silent march protesting Nixon’s presidential nomination at the 1972 Republican 
National Convention, took place in the East.187 For Hunt, the West was a place to briefly mention 
single incidents or the actions of an individual chapter. The Los Angeles chapter continued 
operations when lack of funding forced the national offices had to close.188 During Operation 
Peace on Earth, VVAWers occupied a “hospital ward at Travis Air Force Base.”189 Four hundred 
protested at Fort Ord, “fifteen turned themselves in as ‘war criminals’” in San Diego, and 
VVAWers in Seattle occupied the local Republican offices in response to Nixon’s renewed 
bombing campaigns in 1971.190 Examinations of VVAW in the West would fill in a gap in this 
historiography.  
A Generation Divided, the only other sociology text investigated here, attempted to 
reshape the perceptions of the 1960s by arguing that it was a decade where the New Right 
flourished alongside the New Left and examining commonalities and divergences between the 
two disparate groups. Klatch relied on two different sources for her book. First, she conducted 
“life histories” with seventy-four former activists to study how the participants in the two 
organizations remembered their roles in their respective organizations. These made up the bulk 
of her text, a departure from the other histories used here that relied more heavily on archival 
material than interviews. Although she did examine archival materials of both organizations. As 
for the West, Klatch made a significant contribution by complicating both Sale’s and Gitlin’s 
narratives on Prairie Power. Citing both author’s works used here, she outlined the prevailing 
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notion of Prairie Power representing a distinct break from the “Old Guard” of SDS that 
embraced the counterculture more. However, Klatch posited that the distance between the Old 
Guard and Prairie Power was more fluid and ill-defined by proffering her interviews with Jane 
Adams who had joined SDS in 1964, before the Midwest’s rise in power, but held “ambivalent 
views of the counterculture,” and saw benefits to working with the counterculture.191 Although 
she examined both the Young Americans for Freedom and SDS, her work on the latter formed 
her contributions to this historiography.  
The Long March was the most openly political and unabashedly conservative tome on the 
antiwar movement cited here. An art critic for The New Criterion, Kimball saw the cultural 
revolution of the 1960s, of which the antiwar movement was part and parcel, as responsible for 
leaving American culture “rudderless: physically in-tact, its ‘moral center’ in shambles.”192 For 
the antiwar movement Kimball focused mostly on students and criticized them as “bourgeois” 
whose only accomplishment was “blighting a good many lives.”193 Further, he posited that the 
antiwar movement was not about the war at all, an assertion that puts him alone in this 
historiography. Instead “Vietnam was merely the occasion for disruptions and demands that went 
far beyond any specific government policy…The real issue was our way of life: what used to be 
called the ‘American way of life,’ with its social and political institutions, its moral assumptions, 
its unspoken confidences about what mattered.”194 Kimball did fit in with other authors as he saw 
the entire West as existing in the San Francisco Bay. His only explicit exploration of the West is 
on the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley which he argued wanted “the university to 
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transform itself from an academic community into an operating base for political radicalism.”195 
As the only author who openly criticized the antiwar movement, Kimball brought balance to this 
historiography.  
The Vietnam War on Campus was another compendium of essays, specifically focusing 
on student response to the war. Although the entire volume was excellent, three essays, “The 
Refiner’s Fire: Anti-war Activism and Emerging Feminism in the Late 1960s” by Barbara L. 
Tischler, “Healing from the War: Building the Berkeley Vietnam Veterans Memorial” by Joe 
McDonald, and “Lock and Load: The Antiwar Movement comes to a Los Angeles Secondary 
School” by Marc Jason Gilbert, are of most interest here. In the introduction Gilbert compared 
contemporary perceptions of the antiwar movement, that is response during the war, to 
prevailing notions at the time of publication. He posited that during the war society saw 
antiwarriors as left-wing elites at prestigious institutions who did not understand the nature of 
war or the war itself. Gilbert contrasted that with modern response by both historians and 
politicians, namely former president Bill Clinton and then-senator John Kerry. Politicians tended 
to “dismiss much of the criticism directed at them as the sour grapes of self-deluded defenders of 
a dysfunctional social order too eager to hide its interests in Africa, Latin America, and Asia 
beneath the mantle of moral anticommunism.”196 He also argued that the antiwar movement was 
right. “The United states had stumbled into war in a country that it knew little about in defense of 
geopolitical assumptions that its own intelligence agencies labeled illusory.”197 The other essays 
also contributed to this historiography and their tight geographic focus filled in spaces in the 
West and the historiography. 
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  Tichler’s chapter on the intersections of feminism and antiwar activism argued that 
studies focusing on the antiwar movement as inspiring feminist movements, miss women’s 
contributions to the antiwar movement itself. Tichler asserted that “During the anti-war 
movement, particularly on college campuses all over the United States but also in the public 
realm of entertainment and in the man’s world of the U.S. military, women honed their skills and 
came to understand their rage at the objective conditions of their lives.”198 Though her article had 
little mention of geography, she did examine how women staged female-centric antiwar protests. 
For example women held a rally and protest at the Oakland Induction Center in February 1966 
after the death of two nurses in Vietnam.199 By placing women in the antiwar movement at the 
center of her study, she created both a new history and a contribution to this historiography.  
The next article, “Healing from the War: Building the Berkeley Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” 
by Joe McDonald examined the construction and ironies of a war memorial in Berkeley, 
epicenter of the western antiwar movement. McDonald, most known for his music with Country 
Joe and the Fish and the antiwar anthem “I Feel Like I’m Fixing to Die Rag,” argued that the 
memorial facilitated reconciliation because it allowed vets to metaphorically “touch the corpse” 
of fallen brothers-in-arms. McDonald also emphasized that, in spite of antiwar sentiment from 
both he and other contributors to the monument’s construction, there was unanimous support of 
troops.200 Even decades after the last battle in Southeast Asia, McDonald pushed for support for 
the veterans and their emotional recovery.  
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The final chapter featured from The Vietnam War on Campus is the editor’s “Lock and 
Load: The Antiwar Movement Comes to a Los Angeles Secondary School” in which he asserted 
even high school students came to think critically about “the Establishment.” Leaning mostly on 
the school’s newspaper for evidence and argument, he contended that it was generally pro-war 
and critical of the antiwar movement as the paper “defended traditional political processes and 
values while attacking not the opponents’ positions, but their character.”201 Like other historians 
who examined the Vietnam War on school campuses, Gilbert found that newspapers themselves 
became places of contention over free speech and free press that ultimately resulted in increasing 
the rights, and thus agency, of student journalists.202 Further, by examining the response of high 
school students in Los Angeles, Gilbert played a second role in this historiography.  
The Whole World is Watching focused on the media in America, specifically its coverage of the 
1968 Democratic National Convention which Gitlin posited was part of the changing “texture” 
of mass media in the 1960s that influenced the New Left.203 A Marxist sociologist and former 
antiwar activist himself, Gitlin used CBS news broadcasts and their archives for his primary 
source base. Although his focus was on Chicago, he also looked west on occasion. Gitlin split his 
Western focus between UC Berkeley and the Prairie Power members of SDS. In Berkeley he 
looked at the interactions between students, most notably for members of FSM, the Vietnam Day 
Committee, and the media. For example, he noted that “Throughout the sub-society of news 
reporters, arrests certify protest events. According to a reporter who covered the Berkeley beat 
for the San Francisco Chronicle in 1965-1966, stories about student activities at the University 
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of California were routinely disqualified as news unless there had been arrests.”204 Gitlin also 
examined Prairie Power. However, he emphasized the culture from which Prairie Power 
members came and asserted that, due to the conservative cultural mores of the plain states, any 
sort of rebellion was sure to “provoke repression,” thus mitigating and explaining the radical 
nature of Prairie Power.205 This conclusion on the new leaders in SDS diverged from previous 
explanations that ignored relative Midwestern culture and did not see rebellion as a natural 
response to conservativism. As it covered the media as an entity, The Whole World is Watching 
provides a valuable framework for this project which also examines the media, albeit a different 
one.  
“The Vietnam Era Antiwar Movement” by Mitchell Hall was the most succinct and non-
academic exploration of the antiwar movement included here. He concluded that the antiwar 
movement earned a “partial victory” as “The public largely accepted the movement's message 
even as it often rejected the activists themselves,” and although they were “Unable to end the 
war directly, the movement was strong enough to alarm the government, creating social 
conditions that limited policy options and made stopping the war possible.”206 Hall also provided 
accessible definitions on the difference between liberals and radicals within the antiwar 
movement that held more clarity than those given by Debendetti, Chatfield, and Anderson. 
Liberals, the largest contingency throughout the antiwar movement, believed that they could 
affect change through direct action with the political system. Radicals however, saw American 
bureaucracy as flawed and therefore sought to change society outside of the government’s reach. 
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In the West, Hall briefly emphasized the importance of the Spring Mobilization Committee to 
End the War in Vietnam as it brought together the sometimes disparate liberals, radicals and 
pacifists. Later, Hall glanced toward Oakland where “police fought 3,500 radicals attempting to 
close down the city’s induction center.”207 Hall’s brevity and clarity on the accomplishments of 
the antiwar movement addressed a general reader that other works here missed.  
Also published in 2004, Lieberman’s Prairie Power attempted to complicate the 
prevailing narrative on the contingency that rose to power in the middle years of the 1960s. By 
focusing his entire monograph on the group, he hoped to humanize the Midwestern students and 
delved into their personal politics as “Prairie Power was not just a contingent of SDS; it was a set 
of values and a style of protest that to some extent distinguished student activism at large 
Midwestern state universities from that at more elite and urban institutions.”208 Further, contrary 
to previous historians like Terry Anderson and in line with Klatch’s findings, prairie students did 
not have a unified ideology, although he admitted most “were affected by the counterculture, and 
virtually all have maintained the values to which they came in that turbulent era.”209 Lieberman’s 
contributions to this historiography are twofold. First, he provided a working thesis and 
definition on Prairie Power.  He described them as “a group of southern and Midwestern activists 
who emphasized organizing students around local issues, decentralizing SDS leadership, and 
focusing on the war in Vietnam” that “shaped the New Left in the late sixties and early 
seventies”210 Further, he called for historians to perform more local and regional studies as 
previous monographs on the movement had too broad of a scope and were therefore 
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premature.211 As the current historiography on the antiwar movement in the West focused almost 
exclusively on the Bay Area, this call for more studies with a tight focus is apt.  
Another national overview of the antiwar movement, The War Within, by Tom Wells 
looked at the interplay between the antiwar movement and the federal government. Wells argued 
that, for all its miscalculations and deep divisions, while simultaneously underestimating its own 
strength, the movement prevented Nixon from escalating the war at “critical junctures.”212 Like 
Anderson, Wells looked at various aspects of the movement beyond Berkeley, but never broke 
out of California. For example, he examined a demonstration of sixty thousand in San Francisco 
in April of 1967, concluding that “the Santa Clara county labor council’s endorsement of the 
protest and the participation of thousands of trade union members were marked signs of the 
peace movement’s continuing growth.”213 Further, he gave little attention to the violence at the 
Oakland Induction Center during the International Days of Protest that other authors used to 
show the radicalization of the movement.214 Wells contributed to this historiography by looking 
beyond Berkeley, but could not manage to escape the state.  
Melvin Small’s second contribution to this historiography, Antiwarriors, also gave a 
national overview of the antiwar movement. However he was also interested in the movement’s 
effect on the president and federal policy. Small concluded that those in it believed that they did 
in fact shorten the war. However, his historical conclusion is much more tempered as 
“reasonable evaluation of the antiwar movement falls somewhere between that of activists who 
proudly claim credit for stopping the war and that of former U.S. officials who report that the 
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only ones influenced by the doves were the Communists who held out longer than they would 
have because they misunderstood American politics.”215 Small also differed from other historians 
like Lieberman and Klatch, stating that the New Left disproportionately consisted of “children of 
the establishment at leading colleges and universities.”216 Further, as his book examined the 
relationship between the federal government and the movement, the Small grants the West little 
attention in his book. Even UC Berkeley received only passing mentions for the underground 
newspaper, The Berkeley Barb, the Free Speech Movement, teach-ins and SLATE. Although 
Small called for participants in the movement to write about their experiences and argued that it 
is their duty, few in the West answered.  
Unlike most of the texts cited here, Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement did not 
make significant headway into new scholarship, instead it attempted to give a more broad but 
clear overview of the movement than previous authors, finding a balance point between large 
monographs like The Movement and the Sixties and Mitchel Hall’s brief article. However, Simon 
Hall did present the movement as being simultaneously successful, because of its longevity and 
“innovative tactics,” but flawed due to factionalism and being less popular than the war itself.217 
Unlike other authors like Debendetti, Hall shied away from making an assessment on the 
efficacy of the movement and stated that it is ambiguous as to whether or not the antiwar 
movement helped end the war itself. A professor of history at the University of Leeds, Hall is the 
only author cited here not holding degrees, advanced or undergraduate, from a university in the 
United States. However, his research interests have been inside America his entire intellectual 
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career. As an outsider looking in, but with acumen and credentials, Hall provided a much needed 
international perspective on the antiwar movement.  
Another sociologist, Penny Lewis, vetted the collective American perception, or memory, 
of the Vietnam War in an attempt to correct it. She opened her book with the prevailing 
narratives on the New Left as supplanters of the Old Left, upper-middle class, intellectuals. 
However, her research on the socioeconomic status of hawks and doves showed that “by and 
large, the greatest support for the war came from the privileged elite, despite the visible 
dissention of a minority of its leaders and youth [emphasis hers].”218 Lewis broke her book into 
two parts. The first examined the accuracy and origins of the “elite antiwarrior” architype. She 
concluded that the “middle class culture of the main antiwar organizations” in the early years of 
the movement explain why those who opposed the war in the working class never joined in 
representative numbers. Her second half explained the longevity of antiwar myths and leaned 
heavily on the media and politicians who had the cultural capital to shape myths to their benefit 
which “elite antiwarriors” architype does as it ensured continued loyalty of the working class.219 
Lewis’ monograph also did well in the West as she frequently referred to coalitions in California, 
mostly centered on San Francisco bay.   
Subversives took an in-depth look at the interplay between the FBI and the antiwar 
movement and how Reagan used them to gain political clout in California, most notably in the 
1968 gubernatorial election. Leaning on declassified FBI documents through a Freedom of 
Information Act request, Seth Rosefeld found that the FBI held files on “hundreds of students, 
professors, and on members of the board of regents; established informers within student groups, 
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the faculty, and the highest levels of the university’s administration; and gathered intelligence 
from wiretaps, mail openings, and searches of Berkeley homes and offices in the dead of 
night.”220 Although Rosefeld largely focused on groups outside the antiwar movement, like 
FSM, he also gave significant attention to the Berkeley Draft Information Committee, Stop the 
Draft Week, and the Vietnam Day Committee. Most notably, Rosefeld portrayed the protestors at 
the Oakland Induction Center during Stop the Draft week in a significantly brighter, less 
anarchical light than other authors in spite of his claim that the week contained the “most militant 
antiwar demonstrations.”221 Like Berkeley at War, Rosefeld contributed a tightly focused tome 
on Berkeley to the antiwar historiography.  
The historiography is not complete, however as there is still a dearth minorities, women, 
veterans, and local studies. Although minorities were largely against the war due to the unfair 
nature of selective service, they were proportionately uninvolved in the movement. Lewis’ study 
got at the sociological exclusion of minorities, but did not examine those outside the organized 
movement. Although, some authors like Anderson in The Movement and the Sixties, did note 
intersections in the West, most notably the Black Panthers and the Chicano movement. Women 
also remain a point of exclusion in the historiography. Klatch attempted to provide insight into 
the role of women. But due to women being disproportionately underrepresented, she did not 
want to give an unrealistic view of SDS by interviewing them in numbers equal to men. Also 
notable, is Sale’s emphasis that SDS was a “seedbed for women’s liberation,” while other later 
authors like Lieberman and Tischler emphasized sexism in the movement. Although VVAW’s 
most public actions all took place on the east coast, the most prominent antiwar group after the 
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breakup of SDS in 1970 remains completely absent here, in spite of having chapters in every 
state. Finally, historians have produced few in-depth local studies on the movement, especially 
outside of Berkeley. Once these notable demographically, organizationally, and geographically-
based gaps are filled, the historiography will be much more complete.  
Further, once historians finally break out of the Bay Area, they open up a whole new 
realm of analytical possibilities. The most obvious may be to compare the radicals of Berkeley 
and those on the prairie. But further comparative possibilities exist. For example, a historian 
might aim to replicate the work of Kenneth Heinemann who used the antiwar movements at non-
elite state universities in the upper Midwest and northeast to balance out the overemphasis on 
elite campuses.222 Finally, historians need further direct comparisons between the YAF and SDS 
beyond A Generation Divided. Although useful as a sociology, it focuses too much on the 
memory and identity of individual subjects, thus the larger narratives of the two organizations 
becomes lost.  
In conclusion, the current historiography of the antiwar movement in the West 
disproportionately focuses on the Bay Area, specifically UC Berkeley. Although the university 
was a major site of creating antiwar sentiment, students at other universities and in other 
organizations campaigned against the war at this time. Defined as all land west of the Mississippi 
river, the current historiographic shortcomings go beyond geographic want. Only Tichler’s 
article, “The Refiner’s Fire,” focused on the role of women. Anderson explored the intersections 
between various movements like the Black Panthers and the antiwar movement during the 60s, 
but did not examine the experiences of minority students within the antiwar movement. Although 
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they were always a disproportionately low number of members within the organized movement, 
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